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First flesh on the bones of the new UK government’s energy policy?

The UK Department of Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy (BEIS) chose 9 November 2016 to release a series of long-awaited energy policy documents.  The substance of some of the announcements, which primarily cover subsidies for renewable electricity generation and the closure of the remaining coal-fired generating plants in England and Wales, was first outlined almost a year ago when Amber Rudd, the last Secretary of State for Energy and Climate Change, “re-set” energy policy in outline in a speech of 18 November 2016.  Broadly speaking, the documents indicate that little has changed in the UK government’s thinking on energy policy following the EU referendum and the formation of what is in many respects a new government under Theresa May.

Contracts for Difference

BEIS has confirmed that the next allocation process for contracts for difference (CfDs) for renewable generators will begin in April 2017, aiming to provide support for projects that will be delivered between 2021 and 2023. There will be no allocation of CfD budget for onshore wind or solar, consistent with the Government’s view that these are mature and/or politically undesirable technologies which should no longer receive subsidies.  The only technologies supported will be offshore wind, certain forms of biomass or waste-fuelled plant (advanced conversion technologies, anaerobic digestion, biomass with CHP) wave, tidal stream and geothermal.

The budget allocation is a total of £290 million for projects delivered in each of the delivery years covered: 2021/22 and 2022/23. Details are set out in a draft budget notice and accompanying note.  CfDs are awarded in a competitive auction process, the details of which are set out in an “Allocation Framework” (the one used for the last auction, in 2014/2015, can be found here).  It is likely that most, if not all, of the budget will be taken up by a small number of offshore wind projects, as the size of the projects which could be eligible to bid in the auction is large in comparison with the available budget.

Competition for CfDs will be fierce and Government should be able to show progress towards achieving its target of reducing support to £85/MWh for new offshore wind projects by 2026. For the 2017 auction, “administrative strike prices” have been set at levels designed to ensure that “the cheapest 19% of projects within each technology” can potentially compete successfully.  Behind this terse statement and the methodology it summarises lies an extensive BEIS analysis of Electricity Generation Costs, underpinned or verified by studies or peer reviews by Arup, Imperial College, NERA, Prof Anna Zalewska, Prof Derek Bunn, Leigh Fisher and Jacobs and EPRI.

The heat is on

Alongside the draft budget notice, BEIS has published two documents about CfD support for particular technologies.

One of these is a consultation that returns to the long-unanswered question of what to do about onshore wind on Scottish islands: should it be regarded as just another species of onshore wind (and therefore not to receive subsidy, in line with post-2015 Government policy), or does it face higher costs to a degree that merits a special place in the CfD scheme, as was suggested by the 2010-2015 Government?  It comes as no surprise that the Government favours the former view: another item to add to the list of points on which the UK and Scottish Governments do not see eye to eye.

The second document is a call for evidence on the currently CfD-eligible thermal renewable technologies of biomass or waste-fuelled technologies (including biomass conversions), and geothermal.  These raise a number of issues, on which the call for evidence takes no clear stance.

  • Is continued support for the fuelled technologies in particular consistent with getting “value for money” by focusing subsidies on the cheapest ways of decarbonising the power supply (except onshore wind and solar), given that (with the exception of biomass conversions), they have a relatively high levelised cost of electricity generation?
  • Can they be justified on the grounds that they are “despatchable” (and so do not impose the same burdens on the system as “variable” renewable generation like wind and solar)?  Or on the grounds that (where they incorporate combined heat and power), they contribute to the decarbonisation of heat, as well as of power generation – an area in which more progress needs to be made soon in order to meet our overall target for reducing greenhouse gas emissions under the Climate Change Act 2008 (and the Paris CoP 21 Agreement)?
  • Is the current relationship between the CfD and Renewable Heat Incentive support schemes the right one in this context?  Is a CfD for a CHP plant unbankable because of the risk of losing the heat offtaker?
  • Are all these technologies about to be overtaken as potential ways of decarbonising the heat sector on a large scale by other contenders such as hydrogen or heat pumps (and if so, is that a reason to abandon them as targets for CfD or other subsidy)?
  • Should more existing coal-fired power stations be subsidised to convert to burning huge quantities of wood pellets (is that really “sustainable” – and would such subsidies comply with current EU state aid rules, for as long as they or something like them apply in the UK)?

Against this background, the draft budget notice proposes to limit advanced conversion technologies, anaerobic digestion and biomass with CHP to 150MW of support in the next CfD auction.

Kicking the coal habit

Finally, BEIS is consulting on the best way to “regulate the closure of unabated coal to provide greater market certainty for investors in the generation capacity that is to replace coal stations as they close, such as new gas stations”.  The consultation needs to be read alongside BEIS’s latest Fossil Fuel Price Projections (with supporting analysis by Wood Mackenzie).  These set out low, central and high case estimates of coal, oil and gas prices going forward to 2040.  BEIS has significantly reduced its estimates for all three fuels under all three cases as compared with those in its 2015 Projections.

We are talking here about eight generating stations, which between them can produce 13.9GW. Their share of GB electricity supply tends to fluctuate with the relative prices of coal and gas.  Most are over 40 years old.  All can only survive by taking steps to comply with the limits on SOx, NOx and dust prescribed by the EU Industrial Emissions Directive – at least for as long as the UK is within the EU.

The Government’s difficulty is how to ensure that these plants close (for decarbonisation purposes), but on a timescale and in circumstances that ensure that the contribution that they make to security of electricity supply is replaced without a gap by e.g. new gas-fired plant, of which so little has recently been built. BEIS evidently hopes that by the time this consultation finishes on 1 February 2017, the results of next month’s four-year ahead Capacity Market auction will have seen a significant amount of new large-scale gas fired power projects being awarded capacity agreements at prices that make them viable (when taken together with expectations of lower-for-longer gas prices).

Although BEIS professes confidence in the changes that it has made to the rules and market parameters for the next Capacity Market auctions, one cannot help but wonder how convinced Ministers are that the 2016 auctions will succeed in this respect where those of 2014 and 2015 failed.  Because from one point of view, if the Capacity Market does result in new large gas-fired projects with capacity agreements, and gas prices remain low, the market should simply replace the existing coal-fired plants – which, as the consultation points out, aren’t even as flexible as modern gas-fired plant.  Maybe if a newly inaugurated President Trump pushes ahead with his plans to revive the use of coal in the US, higher coal prices will help accelerate the closure of some of our remaining coal-fired plants: BEIS calculates that with relatively low coal prices and no Government intervention, they could run until 2030 or beyond.

So how will Government make the plants close? Two options are proposed.  One would be to require them to retrofit carbon capture and storage (CCS), the other would be to require them to comply with the emissions performance standard (EPS) that was set in the Energy Act 2013 for new fossil-fuelled plant with a view to ensuring that no new coal plant was commissioned.  Neither path is entirely straightforward.  As it seems unlikely that operators would invest the kinds of sums associated with CCS on such old plant, there must be a risk that in trying to make CCS a genuine alternative to complete closure, regulations could end up allowing operators to run a significant amount of capacity without CCS whilst taking only limited action to develop CCS capacity.  With the EPS approach, there would be some tricky questions to resolve around biomass co-firing, as well as biomass conversion, if that were to remain an eligible CfD technology and budget were to be allocated to it.

When it comes to consider how to ensure that coal closure does not involve a “cliff-edge” effect, the consultation seems to run out of steam a bit: having mentioned the possibility of limiting running hours or emissions, either on a per plant basis or across the whole sector, BEIS says simply that it would “welcome any views on whether a constraint [on coal generation prior to closure] would be beneficial and, if so, any ideas on the possible profile and design”.

What next?

Nothing stands still.  The period of these consultations / calls for evidence, and the next Capacity Market auctions, overlaps with other processes.  Over the next few months, the Government is scheduled to produce over-arching plans or strategies in a number of areas that overlap with some of the questions posed in these documents.  It will also continue to develop its strategy for Brexit negotiations with the EU; and the European Commission will publish more of its proposals on Energy Union (including new rules on renewables, market operation and national climate and energy plans).

The documents state more than once that while the UK is an EU Member State, it will “continue to negotiate, implement and apply” EU legislation. But – at least in relation to coal closure – the Government is trying to make policy here for the 2020s.  By that time, it presumably hopes, it will no longer be constrained by EU law.  It remains to be seen how Brexit will affect the participation of our remaining coal-fired plants in the EU Emissions Trading System, which is at present a significant feature of the economics of such plant.  In the short term, the coal consultation points to an announcement in the Chancellor’s 2016 Autumn Statement (23 November) of the “future trajectory beyond 2021” of the UK’s own “carbon tax”, the carbon price support rate of the climate change levy.

After a period in which we have been relatively starved of substantive energy policy announcements, things are starting to move quite fast, and decisions taken by Government over the next few months could have significant medium-to-long-term consequences for UK energy and climate change policy.

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First flesh on the bones of the new UK government’s energy policy?

UK renewable Contracts for Difference – now only for offshore wind?

The UK’s Contracts for Difference (CfD) regime for renewable subsidies was one of the principal pillars of the Electricity Market Reform programme put in place by the 2010-2015 Coalition Government.  In one way or another, the CfD regime aimed to provide revenue stability for most renewable technologies in projects of more than 5 MW, with consumers sharing in the upside at times when power prices exceed the guaranteed “strike price” set in a competitive allocation process.

Before the UK General Election of May 2015, it was also expected that auctions would follow a regular annual rhythm – or possibly occur more than once a year for some technologies. But things have changed a lot in the last seven months in the world of CfDs – and they continue to change.

  • The Conservative Party, victorious in May 2015, had campaigned on a manifesto promise of “no new subsidies for onshore wind”, which they have been quick to implement, and which appears to include the exclusion of onshore wind (except perhaps on Scottish islands) from future CfD auctions.
  • On 11 February 2016, the Secretary of State for Energy and Climate Change, Amber Rudd, told Parliament: “We don’t have plans at the moment for a large-scale solar contract [for difference]“.
  • The day before, her Department announced “an independent review into the feasibility and practicality of tidal lagoon energy in the UK” – appearing to cast more than a little doubt over the prospects of the Swansea Bay Tidal Lagoon project, with which the Department had previously been said to be negotiating CfD support (tidal lagoon projects, like nuclear ones, fall outside the scope of the competitive CfD allocation framework).
  • The news that the European Commission has doubts about the compatibility with EU state aid rules of the proposed CfD for the conversion of a third unit at the Drax coal-fired power station to burning biomass perhaps makes it unlikely that there will be many, or any, more CfDs awarded for this technology.
  • Almost a year after the results of the first (delayed) CfD auction were announced, there is no sign as yet of Government gearing up for a second auction any time soon – merely a promise that there will be funding for three more auctions before mid-2020.

To be fair, so far, nothing has been said to suggest that Energy from Waste with CHP, Hydro (up to 50 MW), Landfill Gas, Sewage Gas, Wave, Tidal Stream, Advanced Conversion Technologies, Anaerobic Digestion, Biomass with CHP or Geothermal will not be eligible if and when the second auction finally takes place, but the fact remains that for the foreseeable future, offshore wind appears likely to dwarf all the other CfD-eligible technologies.

In clearing the original CfD rules for state aid purposes, the European Commission noted, as apparently relevant facts, that “All generators producing electricity from renewable energy sources will be able to bid for a CfD on non-discriminatory basis (albeit that some less established technologies will initially benefit from allocated budgets in order to promote their further development).“, and that “in the absence of aid renewable energy technologies will not be deployed at the required scale and pace, as without the aid such projects would not be financially viable.”  This was in keeping with the emphasis in the relevant State Aid Guidelines that an “auctioning or competitive bidding process open to all generators producing electricity from renewable energy sources…should normally ensure that subsidies are reduced to a minimum“, but admitting that “given the different stage of technological development of renewable energy technologies“, technology specific tenders may be allowed “on the basis of the longer-term potential of a given new and innovative technology, the need to achieve diversification; network constraints and grid stability and system (integration) costs“.

The statutory framework for CfD auctions allows the Secretary of State enormous flexibility to determine, at very short notice and in documents which are not subject either to Parliamentary approval or any statutory consultation requirement (the “budget notices” and “allocation frameworks”), which technologies will be eligible for support in a given auction.  However, it must be arguable that a decision effectively to exclude technologies as significant (and competitive) as onshore wind and solar from the allocation process could amount to a change in the CfD rules which should itself be notified to the Commission for state aid approval.  And it is not entirely clear that such exclusions could be – or at any rate have been – justified on the grounds specified in the Guidelines as a basis for technology specific tenders.

A cynic or conspiracy theorist might suspect that the lack of urgency in proceeding to a second CfD auction may not be unrelated to the UK Government’s reluctance to put itself – in advance of a referendum on the UK’s continued membership of the EU – in the position of appearing to have to ask the Commission’s permission (in the form of a state aid clearance for alterations to the CfD rules) not to offer CfDs to technologies that Ministers do not want to subsidise.  But cynics and conspiracy theorists are often wrong.  The Government is perhaps more likely to be just taking its time to consider the future of CfDs more broadly.  For example, in the 11 February 2016 Parliamentary exchanges referred to above, Ministers confirmed that they are looking “very closely” at the seductively labelled and highly fashionable concept of “subsidy-free CfDs” (which means different things to different people, but for one interesting suggestion, see this blog post by Professor Michael Grubb of UCL).

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UK renewable Contracts for Difference – now only for offshore wind?

DECC’s latest consultation on Feed-in Tariffs – an Era of “FIT Austerity”?

The UK Department of Energy and Climate Change (DECC) has launched a consultation proposing savage cuts in the levels of subsidy under the Feed-in Tariffs (FITs) regime for small-scale renewable electricity generation (the Consultation).  This comes only a few weeks after DECC announced the ending of more or less all subsidies for onshore wind, the removal of the renewables exemption from the Climate Change Levy and other proposals designed to reduce the costs of renewable subsidies significantly.  What does the Consultation say, and what does it mean for the future of renewables in the UK?  We look first at the background of the FITs regime and then at the detail of the proposals.

Some background

The legal foundation for the FITs regime was inserted very late in the Parliamentary passage of the Bill that became the Energy Act 2008.  Although there had been pressure to include provision for FITs from the moment the Bill was introduced in January 2008, the then Labour Government only finally gave in to it on 5 November 2008, by which time the Bill was rubbing shoulders in the Parliamentary timetable with legislation designed to avert financial meltdown as a result of the banking crisis.

Perhaps we should not be surprised that a scheme launched in the far-off days of Gordon Brown’s premiership should now be in the process of being dismantled, after 5 years of apparently too successful operation, as part of the current Conservative Government’s attempts to reduce public spending (whether funded from taxation or levies on consumers).  To see quite how different the world looked in 2008, it is worth recalling that Ministers then looked forward to a time when, by 2020, the Renewables Obligation (RO), newly modified to include different bands of support for different technologies would be “worth about £1 billion a year in support of the renewables industry”.  Current annual support under the RO runs at around three times this level, and it may hit £5 billion by 2020.

During the passage of the 2008 Energy Bill, EU Member States were set the targets for the percentage of final energy consumption from renewable sources that they would have to meet by 2020 under the Renewables Directive of 2009.  Some suggested that the UK would not meet its target of 15% unless FITs were introduced.  There was a widely held view that following the German model of FITs was at least an essential supplement to the RO, and that feed-in tariffs were generally, and could be in the UK, a cheaper way of subsidising renewables.

That was perhaps over-optimistic.  DECC and Ofgem figures show that in 2013-2014, generating stations accredited under the RO produced 49.6 TWh, or 16.3% of electricity supplied in the UK. At the same time, FIT installations produced 2.6 TWh, or 0.84% of the UK’s final consumption of electricity.  But whilst the output of RO-subsidised generation to FIT-subsidised generation stood in a ratio of about 19:1, the comparative costs of RO were no more than 4 times those of FITs.  Another comparison from DECC’s evidence review of FITs is even more interesting, when it calculates that the p/kWh cost of FIT-generated electricity is about 3 times the level of the strike price under the proposed Contract for Difference (CfD) for the Hinkley Point C nuclear power station.

Perhaps this should come as no surprise.  FITs were intended as a way of encouraging “microgeneration”.  One of the ways that renewables resemble other forms of power generation is that they tend to be more cost-effective on a larger than on a smaller scale.  But FITs were not just about meeting targets: they were to make renewable generation accessible to individual households for whom trying to deal with the RO was (in the words of one MP, apparently speaking from personal experience) a “bloody nightmare”.  FITs would be simple, and they would popularise renewables.

That part certainly seems to have worked.  As DECC notes, the scheme has all but reached 750,000 FIT installations already – a level it was not originally expected to reach until 2020.

Headline proposals

DECC says that the deployment of FITs has been significantly exceeding its projections both in terms of numbers of installations and installed capacity. As a result, the FIT scheme has put undue financial pressure on the Levy Control Framework (LCF), which was created to limit the extent to which consumer bills increase to fund the subsidies for low-carbon generation.  The measures proposed in the Consultation are intended to remedy these problems.

Significant decreases in generation tariffs for solar PV, wind and hydro power 

At the larger end of the scale of FIT eligible installations, generation tariff reductions are proposed for:

  • standalone solar PV (Large Solar PV) – from 4.28 p/kWh to 1.03 p/kWh;
  • wind farms with a capacity >1.5 MW (Large Wind) – from 2.49 p/kWh to 0 p/kWh; and
  • hydro installations with a capacity  >2MW (Large Hydro) – from 2.43 p/kWh to 2.18 p/kWh.

Installations with smaller capacity would also see their tariffs reduced, in the case of solar PV, even more steeply, with 4 kW installations having an 87% reduction in generation tariff levels.

In addition, the different capacity-based generation tariff bands for each technology would change (their number being reduced in the case of wind and hydro and the boundaries redrawn for solar).

It can be said that the relative levels of reduction in generation tariffs roughly correspond to the extent to which DECC’s Impact Assessment reckons the different sizes and types of installation have seen reductions in their grid connection and capex costs since 2012.  But only roughly: for example, it appears that Large Solar PV has seen an increase of 3% in costs and will have its tariff reduced by 76%, while the smallest PV installations have seen a decrease in costs of 35% and will have their tariff reduced by 87%. These reductions in generation tariffs are said to be aiming at a target rate of return of 4%, as compared to the 5-8% range of rates of return that was used to calculate the current tariff rates

The changes would mean that for future solar PV installations, the generation tariff (received on all the power they generate) would be a much less significant component of their revenue stream than it has been historically.  For those receiving the export tariff for the electricity which they export (or are deemed to export), the export tariff is likely, at least initially, to be higher in p/kWh terms, but by far the largest benefit for those who consume the renewable electricity that they produce will be in the avoidance of the costs of purchasing electricity generated elsewhere from a third party supplier.

The problem for most solar installations though, especially on domestic premises, is that for much of the year, the bulk of household energy consumption tends to occur at times when there is no sun and no generation.  The solution to that would be to connect your PV panels to a battery and store the electricity generated during daylight hours for the evening.  But – needless to say – the Consultation contains no proposals for any new German-style subsidy for adopting storage technology.

Degression

At present, FIT generation tariffs “degress” periodically by a fixed percentage automatically, but can degress further if deployment reaches specified thresholds (contingent degression).

The Consultation proposes:

  • a new fixed quarterly degression mechanism, reducing generation tariffs available for new Large Solar PV to zero by January 2019.  DECC is not proposing to degress the generation tariffs for Large Hydro, which would stand at 2.18p/kWh throughout the three-year period budgeted for under the Consultation;
  • harmonising the frequency of degression to quarterly across all technologies; and
  • a further degression of 5% if deployment of FITs exceeds DECC’s deployment projections, and 10% if the cap (discussed below) on the eligibility of new projects for the FIT scheme is reached.

The Impact Assessment takes as a working assumption the proposition on which DECC consulted in July, that future FIT eligible installations will not be able to protect themselves from the impact of degression by applying for preliminary accreditation when they have planning permission and an accepted offer of a grid connection, thereby “locking in” to the higher tariff band prevailing at the time of preliminary accreditation for a period of between 6 and 30 months (depending on technology and ownership of the installation) provided that they are commissioned and accredited within that period.

Indexation

Previously, both generation and export tariffs have risen automatically in line with the Retail Price Index (as under the RO).  New installations will see their tariff payments rise according to the movements of the Consumer Price Index link (as under the CfD regime), which is less generous.

Overall cap

So far, the proposed changes, although they slash the amounts of support available to new installations, leave the basic architecture of the regime in place.  But the existence of the proposed new FIT regime is a much more precarious thing than might be suggested by any of the above.

This is because DECC further proposes:

  • a maximum overall budget for the FIT scheme of £75 – 100 million for the period from January 2016 to 2018/2019.  This would apparently be expressed as a series of quarterly limits on FIT-supported deployment at each generation tariff level, so that once the cap is reached no further generating capacity would be eligible for the tariff during the period to which the cap applies;
  • separate caps for each of a number of different capacity-based bands for solar and wind (each of which cover a number of generation tariff bands).  These would limit quarterly FIT solar deployment, for example, to between 42 MW and 54 MW during the period budgeted for by DECC in the Consultation (Q1 2016 – Q1 2019).  This is less than is typically accredited in a single month at present.  The caps on larger solar installations would limit deployment under FIT to one or two per quarter; and
  • unlike the measures relating to generation tariffs and degression, the caps would apply to anaerobic digestion (AD) installations as well as solar, wind and hydro.

With exquisite understatement, DECC observes: “We recognise that implementing deployment caps presents significant logistical challenges.”, although DECC has outlined a number of possible ways in which the caps might be administered (essentially, by Ofgem or by licensed suppliers).  Anticipating the possible objections to a system where eligibility for a particular tariff (or any support at all) would depend on the relative timing of accreditation of different installations, measured in seconds, DECC proposes to suspend the FIT regime pending any better suggestions.  Anticipating the objection that a cap will simply not achieve its purpose of controlling costs, the Consultation proposes the alternative solution of ending generation tariffs altogether, possibly as soon as January 2016.  The industry is, in effect, challenged to accept the capping proposals or face potentially worse consequences.

Almost as an afterthought, DECC adds that its consideration of “further amendments to the existing FITs scheme to ensure that it provides better value for money” includes “consideration of whether future applications within a system of caps could be prioritised through a competitive process“.  It’s a pity the CfD regime, with its competitive allocation process, wasn’t designed to cover microgeneration.

Other points

DECC is concerned that (especially in the wind and AD sectors) the “extension” of an existing FIT installation – or developing what is in truth a single installation in a series of separately accredited stages – can be used as a way to gain the benefits of economies of scale associated with larger installations whilst qualifying for the higher generation tariff rates associated with smaller installations, leading to “overcompensation”.  To put an end to this, it is proposed to “put in place a rule to prevent new extensions claiming support under FITs.”  No detail is given as to how this will work in practice.

When the Energy Bill was being debated back in 2008, three issues were often raised (not necessarily in connection with FITs) on which less progress has been made in the intervening years than could have been wished: smart meters, the impact of small-scale renewable generation on distribution networks, and energy efficiency.  The Consultation has something to say on each.

  • DECC propose to end the practice of estimating how much electricity smaller installations export to the grid (deemed exports) in favour of full metering of exports, and may take further measures to enable remote generation meter reading.  The key question here seems to be whether existing installations of 30kW and below should be compelled to accept smart or “advanced” meters in order to facilitate this more accurate and “remote” measurement of their FIT entitlements.  DECC note that deemed exports were meant to be a temporary measure.  It remains to be seen whether smart meters will be rolled out before the FITs regime closes to new installations.
  • More accurate measurement of exports would facilitate a further reform: moving to “dynamic” export tariff rates that could reflect changes in the wholesale price of electricity, rather than the current, static export tariff rates.  It is a matter of concern to DECC that “the current export tariff is higher than the wholesale electricity price, with resulting overcompensation of generators by suppliers“.  This is because the tariff is meant to represent the wholesale price less the value of the transmission and distribution costs which suppliers do not have to pay in respect of FIT electricity (even though, DECC acknowledges slightly confusingly “in certain circumstances these can be additional rather than avoided costs“).
  • DECC propose an obligation to notify DNOs of new small-scale generators to facilitate grid management.  The problems of DNOs not being made aware of new generation on the grid are not new.  Such an obligation is perhaps a case of “better late than never”, but would no doubt have been more welcome to DNOs when FIT generating capacity was still increasing at a rate unconstrained by the proposed new caps.
  • DECC propose that roof-mounted solar PV installations seeking to accredit at the higher generation tariff rate should satisfy the requirement of being at least in energy efficiency band D before they commission the solar installation, rather than being able to count the installation itself as one of the things entitling them to be certified at band D or above.  Under the current regime, the higher tariff sees to have become effectively a default rate, applying to 99% of installations, rather than setting any kind of incentive to improve the energy efficiency of buildings.  DECC mentions, but is not yet proposing, the further step of raising the higher tariff threshold to band C.

Finally, DECC is “considering implementing”, but is not yet proposing, changes such that AD plants that sought accreditation under the FIT regime would have to comply with the same sustainability requirements that the feedstock of AD plants seeking support under other renewable incentive mechanisms (e.g. the RO and Renewable Heat Incentive) are required to observe.  This would be to avoid FITs becoming a haven for operators with non-compliant feedstocks.

The good news?

In contrast to some of its recent proposals in relation to the RO, DECC has reasserted its commitment to its “grandfathering” policy on FITs, so that existing installations will not be affected by the proposed changes to tariffs and caps.  However, the Consultation does not address explicitly the question whether any tariff reductions will affect projects which have been pre-accredited (whilst this was still possible) but have not achieved full accreditation at the point when the new tariffs come into effect. Such projects are likely to be at risk of being subject to the new, lower tariffs if construction or grid connection delays result in them not being commissioned and applying for full accreditation within their pre-accreditation periods of e.g. 6 months (12 months for community projects) for solar PV.  But it is to be hoped that if they are commissioned and accredited within their pre-accreditation periods, they will still benefit from the earlier, higher tariffs prevailing at the time of their pre-accreditation.

What next?

The proposed measures in the Consultation, if implemented, will bring about a drastic change in the FITs regime.  Is this anything more than the latest manifestation of fiscal austerity, or are the Government’s proposals for the FITs regime part of a coherent renewables / energy policy?

There are a number of points on which the proposals are notably consistent with other statements of the present Government’s policy on renewables.  The gentlest decrease in solar PV generation tariffs (a mere 62%) has been applied to the 250-1000kW band which most obviously represents the commercial rooftop solar sector that DECC has said it wants to see expanding.  The fact that wind generation tariffs have only been abolished for installations above 1.5kW (with proposed tariff reductions of as little as 37% for the smallest wind installations) tends to reinforce the impression that the current Government’s objections to further onshore wind subsidies owe as much to aesthetic as to financial considerations.  There is a general intention that tariffs should be set at a level that encourages “well-sited” installations rather than making viable those that ought not to be viable.

As noted above, the UK nearly didn’t have a FIT regime.  Political pressure ensured that it did.  It may be that calculations of what was and was not politically feasible resulted in the regime being unreformed for too long after its 2012 review.  A number of the ideas in the Consultation feel as if they could have been more usefully deployed if they had been proposed much earlier, but may now come too late, and/or in too Draconian a form, to save the regime as far as any significant quantity of new installations is concerned.

Whether, in retrospect, the proposals will look like a well marked out path to subsidy-free small-scale renewable generation is hard to assess.  However, it is clear that DECC is determined to avoid a situation in which a large bulge of smaller projects that fail to make the relevant cut-off date for accreditation under the RO flood into the FIT regime instead.  The proposed caps should stop that.

If you would like to discuss any issues arising from this post, please feel free to contact the authors or another member of the London Energy team at Dentons.

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DECC’s latest consultation on Feed-in Tariffs – an Era of “FIT Austerity”?

Levellling the playing field? UK Government reduces effective of price of renewable power by £5/MWh

On 8 July 2015, George Osborne’s Summer 2015 Budget had little new to say about UK energy policy: extension of some North Sea tax reliefs, a review of energy efficiency taxation, repetition of existing commitments to seeking a UN climate change deal at Paris later this year.  However, one measure stood out as an unwelcome surprise for generators of renewable electricity.  From 31 July 2015, suppliers who sell “green” power to business users will have to pay the same “climate change levy” (CCL) of £5.54/MWh as they do when supplying “brown” power from coal, gas or nuclear plant.

The CCL is a tax on business and public sector energy use.  The general rule is that supplies of electricity to non-domestic customers are subject to a levy of £5.54/MWh.  (There are separate or additional rates for supplies of other “taxable commodities” such as coal and gas.)  But electricity generated from renewable sources is exempt.  Generators of such electricity receive “levy exemption certificates” (LECs) from Ofgem which entitle suppliers to claim relief on the tax when they supply the associated power.  As a result, when renewable generators sell their power to suppliers under power purchase agreements (PPAs), part of the payment which they receive from the supplier for each MWh of power that they sell is made up of a proportion of the value of the associated LEC to the supplier.

Brief details of the change announced in the Budget are set out in a policy paper from HMRC.  The removal of the exemption is justified on the grounds that it will contribute to “fiscal consolidation” and “maintain the price signal necessary to incentivise energy efficiency”, and that a third of the value of the exemption (£3.9 billion over the life of the current Parliament) goes to supporting “renewable electricity generated overseas” (possible sub-text: “and those pesky EU single market rules might make it hard for us to stop overseas projects receiving LECs without also removing the entitlement from domestic ones”?).  HMRC also suggest that the value of LECs will be “negligible by the early 2020s, when the supply of renewable electricity will exceed CCL eligible business demand for it”, but even if that is so, it is not clear why it justifies scrapping LECs now, while they are still worth having.

The Budget indicates that there will be some transitional provision: “There will be a transitional period for suppliers, from 1 August 2015, to claim the CCL exemption on any renewable electricity that was generated before that date. The government will discuss the details of this transitional period with stakeholders over the summer and autumn, to determine an appropriate length for it.“.  The relevant legislation will be included in the Summer Finance Bill 2015 and the Finance Bill 2016.

However, the key point is that within a few months, all existing and future renewables projects will be deprived of a small but significant element of their anticipated revenue, and the suppliers who buy their power will have one less reason to purchase renewable power.  Some projects may find that the reduction in the rate of corporation tax, also announced in the Budget, offsets, or helps to offset, the reduction in revenue.  But for projects in the early stage of their operating lives that are on relatively low rates of Renewables Obligation or Feed-in Tariff support, there is likely to be an appreciable impact.  Moreover, the removal of LECs is one of a number of recent changes that may make renewable PPAs less attractive.  These include the shift from the Renewables Obligation to CfDs – admittedly partly counterbalanced by the backstop PPA or “offtaker of last resort” regime – and Ofgem’s decision to increase significantly the imbalance prices that suppliers can be exposed to as a result of contracting with intermittent generators.

The good news is that removing renewable generators’ entitlement to LECs will help to reduce the deficit.  The Government’s estimates of the impact of the measure show a positive impact on annual tax revenues of £450 million in 2015/2016 rising steadily to £910 million in 2020/2021.

Behind these fairly large increases in Exchequer revenues lie some significant negative effects on individual projects.  Shares in Drax fell substantially on the announcement and the company indicated that the change could reduce its 2016 earnings by £60m.  It is also possible that projects whose bids set, or were close to, the clearing prices in the first auction of Contracts for Difference (CfDs) may feel the loss of LECs if they included LEC revenues in the financial modelling assumptions for their bids.

The LEC change comes on top of the Government’s announcement of early termination of the Renewables Obligation for onshore wind and suggestions by the Competition and Markets Authority in the summary of its provisional findings on competition in GB energy supply markets that even the competitive allocation process that was used by DECC to allocate CfDs earlier this year may be too generous (in reserving particular “pots” of funding to specified technologies).  While they wait to see what allocation of funding will be made available for new projects in the next CfD round, and when it will take place, renewable generators are likely to want to spend some time reviewing the Change in Law provisions in their existing PPAs (or even CfDs) to see how the loss of LECs affects them.

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Levellling the playing field? UK Government reduces effective of price of renewable power by £5/MWh

Failure of competition in retail energy markets: “disengaged customers” (still) the root cause?

Emerging analysis from the investigation into GB gas and electricity supply by the UK’s Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) suggests that consumers are paying more than they need to because of their failure to “engage in” the market and because of shortcomings in the regulation of the sector.

Some seven months into an investigation instigated by Ofgem and six months after producing its initial issues statement setting out the areas on which it would be focusing, the CMA has published an updated version of the issues statement and a summary of smaller suppliers’ views on barriers to entry and expansion in the market (one of a series of “working papers” that provide more detail of the CMA’s analysis and the evidence on which it is based).

The problem

The CMA is fairly clear that both domestic and “microbusiness” consumers of gas and electricity are paying more than they need to – noting, for example, that “95% of the dual fuel customers” of the Big 6 could have saved an average of between £158 and £234 by switching tariff and/or supplier.  They also note, as others have done before them, that customers on “Standard Variable Tariffs” (SVT) tend to see their bills rising faster and falling slower than increases and decreases in the underlying costs of supply would suggest (the so-called “rocket and feather” effect – see graph below).

CMA fig 1

The search for causes

However, the CMA has so far rejected a number of the “usual suspects” when it comes to explaining why consumers appear to be paying more than they need to, without there being any obvious reason for their loyalty to their existing suppliers.  The initial issues statement was based on four hypothetical “theories of harm” that could account for failures of competition:

  • “market power in electricity generation leads to higher prices;
  • opaque prices and/or low levels of liquidity in wholesale electricity markets create barriers to entry in retail and generation, perverse incentives for generators and/or other inefficiencies in market functioning;
  • vertically integrated electricity companies harm the competitive position of non-integrated firms to the detriment of the customer, either by increasing the costs of non-integrated energy suppliers or reducing the sales of non-integrated generating companies;
  • energy suppliers face weak incentives to compete on price and non-price factors in retail markets, due in particular to inactive customers, supplier behaviour and/or regulatory interventions.”.

Taking each of these in turn, the CMA’s current (but explicitly provisional) analysis is as follows:

  • The Big 6 are not making excessive profits from generation and do not have the ability or incentive – individually or collectively – to increase profits by withdrawing capacity.
  • There are not significant problems as regards the transparency of the wholesale markets.  Those smaller suppliers who complain about a lack of liquidity, at least for certain products, have yet to persuade the CMA that this is a major concern, although they note that Ofgem’s Secure and Promote licence condition has not addressed all the problems in this area.
  • The CMA also does not think that the Big 6’s vertical integration enables them to cause independent generators to restrict their output or allows them to take action in the wholesale markets that disadvantages independent retailers.  One independent supplier saw vertical integration as a competitive disadvantage (potentially tying a supplier to generating plant whose efficiency reduces over time, especially if measured against the best in the market).
  • The only one of the original “theories of harm” which seems to offer an explanation of the failure of competition is the fourth one above, notably “inactive consumers”.  Although the domestic market share of independent suppliers grew from 1% to 7% (electricity) or 8% (gas) between July 2011 and July 2014, the fact remains that almost half of domestic consumers have not switched supplier for at least 10 years.  Many do not even believe switching is possible.  As one of the independent suppliers points out, having a large base of relatively price-insensitive customers on SVT may enable an incumbent to compete more aggressively against new entrants for the business of those who do take active steps to get a good deal.  Another suggests that it is almost as if there are two markets: one composed of potential switchers and another of those who are terminally loyal to their incumbent supplier.

Regulation may be stifling competition

One of the things that stands out in the CMA’s analysis is the emphasis on the potentially adverse effects that various aspects of sectoral regulation may be having on competition.  This is most conspicuous in the addition of two new hypothetical “theories or harm”:

  • “the market rules and regulatory framework distort competition and lead to inefficiencies in wholesale electricity markets;
  • the broader regulatory framework, including the current system of code governance, acts as a barrier to pro-competitive innovation and change.”.

But it is also seen elsewhere.  Examples of potentially problematic regulation identified include:

  • Elements in Ofgem’s recent reform of cashout prices (the Electricity Balancing Significant Code Review) “may lead to an overcompensation of generators”.
  • It may be inefficient not to have a system of locational prices for constraints and losses on the transmission network.  It may be that consumers in Scotland and the North of England should be paying more, and those in the South of England paying less, for their electricity.
  • The Capacity Market element of Electricity Market Reform (EMR) “appears broadly competitive”, but the CMA plan to look at if further.  They note that the Contracts for Difference regime may not secure the lowest prices for renewable generation subsidies by having separate “pots” for different technologies, rather than requiring them to compete all-against-all, or by allowing the award of contracts on a non-competitive basis, before observing, equally obviously, that “there are potentially competing objectives that need to be taken into account in the design of the CfD allocation mechanism”.  One independent supplier also characterises the system by which CfD costs are recovered from suppliers as “madness”.
  • But any problems caused by EMR are for the future.  Looking back, the CMA have clearly listened both to those who have criticised Ofgem’s 2009 decision to prohibit regional price discrimination (while providing exemptions for promotional tariffs), which may have led to a consumer-confusing increase in the number of tariffs, and to those who question Ofgem’s 2013 decision to force suppliers to “simplify” their tariff portfolios drastically, which resulted in the loss of tariff discount options that may or may not have been valued by consumers.  However, the CMA have yet to form a final view on the merits of either decision.
  • It has often been observed that the 250,000 account threshold, above which suppliers become subject to the Energy Company Obligation (ECO), may act as a barrier to growth for independent suppliers.  More interestingly, the CMA note that the costs of the social and environmental policies delivered by suppliers “fall disproportionately on electricity rather than gas”, meaning that “domestic consumption of electricity attracts a much higher implicit carbon price than domestic consumption of gas” – which may have implications for the take-up of electrical heating systems (normally thought of as part of decarbonising energy usage).  This is another area where the CMA will be investigating further.
  • Finally, the CMA identify aspects of the Balancing and Settlement Code (BSC) and other industry agreements that could be standing in the way of more effective competition.  They ask, for example, why, once smart meters have been rolled out, there are no plans to move away from the system whereby domestic customers’ consumption is “profiled”, rather than being based on half-hourly meter readings.  Failure to take advantage of the new technology in this way could “distort incentives to innovate”.  The CMA will also be considering further whether there are just too many codes in the electricity industry (constituting a barrier to entry) and whether the mechanisms for changing industry rules may be stacked too heavily in favour of incumbents and the status quo.  On the first point, Elexon itself, administrator of the BSC, apparently thinks that “rationalising” the codes will remove potential barriers to competition.

Next steps

Interested parties have until 18 March 2015 to comment on the updated issues statement.  The next major step will be the publication of “provisional findings”, currently scheduled for May 2015.  Overall, the investigation is not due to conclude before November / December 2015, and it could be extended into 2016.  It is of course far too early to speculate on possible remedies, but for now the more obviously Draconian options in the CMA’s armoury, such as the breaking up of vertically integrated groups, appear unlikely outcomes.  Something eye-catching to cause “inactive” consumers to “engage”, and a lot of “boring but important” changes in the regulatory undergrowth around industry codes and agreements seem reasonable bets for now, but there is a long way to go yet.

 

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Failure of competition in retail energy markets: “disengaged customers” (still) the root cause?

Christmas to come late(r) for those seeking UK renewables CfDs

Two more milestones in the implementation of UK Electricity Market Reform (EMR) have been passed in the last 24 hours (15/16 December 2014): the first EMR Capacity Market auction began, and it became clear that the first auction of EMR Contracts for Difference (CfDs) has been postponed until February 2015.

The Capacity Market aims to secure the availability of 48.6GW of reliably despatchable generating plant from the autumn of 2018.  This is being procured by means of a series of bidding rounds in a “descending clock” auction which must be completed by 19 December 2014.  The auction pits existing coal, nuclear, CCGT and peaking plant against each other and against new build gas and diesel generators, but only new build plant and existing plant spending £125/kW or more on refurbishment can act as “price makers” in the bidding process (see further National Grid’s Auction User Guide).

According to the previously advertised timetable, the first CfD auction should already have taken place in early December, with results being notified to applicants between Christmas and the New Year.  Instead, the revised version of the Low Carbon Contracts Company’s GB Implementation Plan for CfDs, published on 15 December 2014, states that those seeking CfDs will be invited to submit their bids on 17 February 2015 (if, at that point, demand for CfDs exceeds supply under the allocation round budget).

The delay has been driven by appeals against decisions on the eligibility of applications.  The Implementation Plan notes that a longer delay is possible if “Tier 2” appeals are not completed by 6 February 2015.  It is interesting that DECC has chosen to delay the CfD auction rather than make use of the mechanism (provided for in Part 8 of the Allocation Regulations and Rule 21 of the Allocation Framework) that allows an auction to go ahead with disputed applications still “pending”.

While we await the eventual outcome of these two first-of-a-kind auctions, we can start to compare and contrast the CfD and Capacity Market processes.

One striking difference is in terms of transparency.  The Capacity Market prequalification process results in publication and regular updating on the EMR Portal of a full list of applicants (both successful and unsuccessful) and their plants.  By contrast, there is no published list of applications for CfDs or the decisions that have been made as to their eligibility to be allocated a CfD.  In some ways this mirrors the bidding processes themselves: the successive rounds of the Capacity Market auction are rather more interactive and offer bidders some (albeit limited) visibility of each other’s behaviour; in the CfD auction, applicants must effectively put everything into their initial sealed bid.

A second major difference is in the scrutiny to which applicants’ claims to have fulfilled the criteria that make them eligible to bid are subjected.  For example, under the CfD legislation, applicants’ claims to have the necessary planning permission for their generating stations have to be substantiated by submitting copies of the relevant documents, which will then be checked by National Grid (albeit possibly in a fairly mechanical way).  By contrast, compliance with the parallel obligations to have any requisite planning permission before bidding in the Capacity Market auction is simply self-certified.

No doubt there will be further debate about these and other design features during 2015.  Already, Ofgem is consulting on possible changes to the Capacity Market Rules.  It has identified as priority areas for consideration the possible streamlining of the prequalification process, price maker memoranda, and rules about demand side response.  Meanwhile, alleged discrimination against the demand side has prompted Tempus Energy to challenge the European Commission’s decision that the Capacity Market is compatible with EU state aid rules.

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Christmas to come late(r) for those seeking UK renewables CfDs

UK electricity interconnectors: all coming together (by about 2020)?

One of the problems faced by the UK in achieving security of electricity supply at an affordable cost is its comparatively low level of interconnection with the electricity networks in other countries.  But recent developments offer some prospect that the UK may become a bit less of a “power island”.

The EU’s goal of a single electricity market has the potential to help national Governments with all three horns of the energy trilemma (how to maintain security and decarbonise whilst keeping energy prices at a reasonable level).  But it cannot be realised without adequate interconnection capacity.  As long ago as 2002, the European Council set EU Member States a target of having electricity interconnections equivalent to at least 10% of their installed production capacity by 2005.  Twelve years on, the UK is only half way to meeting this target.  In May 2014, as part of its work on European energy security, the European Commission proposed an interconnection target of 15% for 2030.  This was adopted by the European Council in its 23 October 2014 conclusions on the EU’s 2030 Climate and Energy Policy Framework.

Meanwhile, as Member States connect increasing amounts of intermittent renewable generating capacity to their networks, leaving them in some cases with total generating capacity that is much greater than the amount of power they can reliably generate at any given moment, the goal of achieving 10% or 15% of total installed generating capacity becomes more challenging (see the statistics and charts below).  While such targets are undoubtedly useful, the optimum proportion of interconnection capacity is not the same for each Member State and is bound to change over time with the evolution of its generating mix and electricity consumption profile.  However, it is not always easy for the market to respond quickly and produce more interconnection capacity where it is most needed given the amounts of capital and the regulatory processes involved.

Achieving an interconnection target of 10% or 15% of installed generating capacity in the UK is particularly challenging.  Even before it began to add significant amounts of renewable generation, the UK had one of the larger generation capacities in the EU, and it is very much more expensive per MW to create connections between the electricity networks of Great Britain and other EU Member States than it is to connect networks between Member States which share a land border.  The costs per km of a subsea cable connection are several times greater than those of an overhead transmission line, and the distances involved in GB interconnectors tend to be larger than those which link the transmission systems of different countries in Continental Europe.

However, if the costs of interconnection are significant, so too are the potential benefits for UK consumers.  In a paper entitled Getting more connected published earlier this year, National Grid estimated that: “each 1GW of new interconnector capacity could reduce Britain’s wholesale power prices up to 1-2%…4-5GW of new links built to mainland Europe could unlock up to £1 billion of benefits to energy consumers per year“.  As the European Commission’s most recent report on energy prices and costs in Europe notes, in some of the countries to which the GB system either is not yet connected or with which it could be much more interconnected, average baseload wholesale electricity prices are up to 40% lower than those in the UK.

So is the potential for new UK interconnection capacity going to be exploited anytime soon?  There are encouraging signs both from a regulatory point of view and in terms of actual projects.

The regulatory treatment of projects is crucial to the development of more interconnection.  In this respect, there have been a number of helpful recent developments for potential UK interconnectors.

  • In August 2014 Ofgem confirmed its intention to implement, with only minor modifications, its previously consulted-on proposals for the regime that will apply to the regulation of near term GB interconnector projects (i.e. those expecting to be commissioned by the end of 2020 and likely to be taking significant investment decisions in 2015).  Ofgem recognises that if the development of new UK interconnection capacity is left to proceed without any form of regulated “consumer underwriting”, it is likely that insufficient new capacity will be built.  It therefore proposes a 25 year regulatory regime of a “cap and floor” on revenues, based on its assessment of the need case and efficient level of costs for projects.  The new regime, building on Ofgem’s approach to the Project Nemo interconnector, aims to combine advantages of both the traditional regulated revenue model and more purely market-based approaches.  Ofgem’s 27 October 2014 consultation on the Caithness Moray transmission project shows how far a regulator’s assessment of efficient costs for a project involving subsea cables can vary from a developer’s estimates.
  • Also in August 2014 the UK Government published a paper entitled Contract for Difference for non-UK Renewable Electricity Projects.  This raises the prospect of Contracts for Difference (CfDs) under the Energy Act 2013 being competed for by and awarded to renewable electricity generating projects outside the UK by 2018.  This is a significant step, given the continuing importance of subsidies for the renewables sector (and coming as it did shortly after the approval by the Court of Justice of EU Member States’ historic tendency not to extend their national renewables support schemes to generators in other Member States – notwithstanding the potential for such restrictions to impede free movement in the single market for electricity).
  • In September 2014, the Government included in a consultation on supplementary design proposals for the Capacity Market established by the Energy Act 2013 an outline of how interconnector owners could participate in future Capacity Market auctions.  This had been promised in the context of obtaining state aid clearance, so as to ensure that the Capacity Market, like similar measures being put in place by other Member States, does not militate against the integration of national markets – clearly a matter of concern to the European Commission.
  • Interconnection is most effective when the interconnector capacity is allocated most efficiently and facilitates the flow of electricity from areas of lower to areas of higher prices (see study on this).  These outcomes should be brought closer by the progress there has been in integrating EU national electricity markets through the Target Model.  In February 2014, the markets in GB and 14 other EU Member States became part of the day-ahead price coupling regime for North-West Europe (and in May 2014 they were joined by Spain and Portugal).  In April 2014, a number of Central European Transmission System Operators, National Regulatory Authorities and Power Exchanges signed an MoU to develop flow-based market coupling, which in time will enable better calculation of the network capacities that are allocated through the price coupling process.
  • Finally, the 2013 EU Regulation on cross-border infrastructure (“projects of common interest” or “PCIs”, which are to be fast-tracked through national consenting processes) should make it easier to get interconnection projects funded and built.

In terms of actual projects, Ofgem’s October 2014 preliminary decision on eligibility of projects to benefit from the cap and floor regime identifies five projects that aim to commission by 2020 and, having come forward in the first cap and floor application window, have been judged sufficiently mature to proceed to the three to six month initial project assessment stage.

The five projects are: FAB Link between GB and France; Greenlink, between GB and the Republic of Ireland; IFA2, between GB and France; NSN, between GB and Norway (recently granted a licence by the Norwegian Government); and Viking Link, between GB and Denmark.

According to Ofgem, these projects, together with Project Nemo and the Channel Tunnel-based ElecLink, could add up to 7.5GW of interconnection – more than doubling existing GB cross-border apacity.  They have a number of points in common.   A number of these projects feature in the ENTSO-E Ten Year Network Development Plan and the European Commission’s list of PCIs.  Most of them involve the Transmission System Operators of one or both of the countries they would run between or companies affiliated to them.  Establishing links between GB consumers and renewable generation outside GB is an important part of the rationale for many of them (the FAB Link project even involves plans for up to 300MW of electricity generated from the tides around Alderney). Recent publicity for the TuNur project to export large amounts of solar-generated electricity from North Africa to Europe, including the UK, shows the scale of the possibilities in this area.

It now remains to be seen whether the further development of the Government’s proposals on non-UK renewable and interconnected capacity – and perhaps more significantly the outcomes of the first CfD and Capacity Market auctions (which will not be open to interconnected / non-UK capacity) – will enhance or detract from the business case for these projects.

 

Illustrative statistics and charts (drawn from EU Energy in Figures: Statistical Pocketbook for 2014 and other European Commission and ENTSO-E publications)

1. Ratio of available cross-border electricity interconnector capacities compared to domestic installed power generation capacities

Source: Ten Year Electricity Network Development Plan, 2012

Source: Ten Year Electricity Network Development Plan, 2012

2. Electricity generation across EU Member States

Table 4_2

3. EU Member States’ power generation supluses and deficits compared to gross inland consumption in Q1 2013 and 2014

figure 2

4. Electricity consumption across EU Member States in Q1 2013 and 2014

consumption

5. EU Member States’ renewable and non-renewable generation

Table 6

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UK electricity interconnectors: all coming together (by about 2020)?

Early closure of RO to >5MW solar PV projects confirmed

Following a consultation that ran from 13 May to 7 July 2014, the UK Government has confirmed its intention that, as a general rule, funding under the Renewables Obligation will not be available to larger scale (>5MW solar) PV projects after 31 March 2015.

There will be a “grace period” of a year for projects which were, in effect, in a position to begin development before 13 May 2014.  Perhaps more usefully for projects which may struggle to meet the requirements for RO accreditation before 31 March 2015, further consultation is taking place on a proposal to protect the position of those projects which only fail to meet the 31 March 2015 cut-off date for commissioning because their electricity network operator has not met a pre-31 March 2015 estimated connection date.

Background

For most technologies, the Renewables Obligation will close on 31 March 2017.  After that date, smaller projects will have to rely on the Feed-in Tariffs regime and larger projects must compete for Contracts for Difference (CfDs) under Electricity Market Reform.  In March 2014, the Government set out its overall approach to the two and a half year  transition period when both the RO and CfD regimes are open to new projects: developers are able to choose between the two schemes (subject to certain qualifications). But subsequently DECC has become increasingly concerned that the rapid growth of the UK solar industry, supported by the “demand-led” RO, will breach the Levy Control Framework (LCF) limits on the overall amount of money that the Treasury will permit to be spent on renewable energy subsidies.  In its May 2014 consultation, DECC estimated that large-scale solar PV deployment under the RO could reach “more than 5GW by 2017”; in the response to that consultation, DECC’s “updated assessment” found that “in the absence of intervention”, up to 10GW of solar PV could deploy within this period, costing some £400m more than was allowed for in the EMR Delivery Plan and exceeding the LCF cap.

Proposals and policy decisions

The table below summarises the Government’s main proposals on RO closure for solar PV in the May consultation and the policy decisions announced in the response to consultation.

table-1

DECC has not been persuaded to change the cut-off date or open up the grace period to a wider group of projects.  Responding to “the main criticism…that any projects that can meet the grace period…requirements are unlikely to need the grace period because they will already be sufficiently advanced to secure connection by 31 March 2015”, DECC states that “the grace period will have fulfilled its purpose if it protects eligible projects that subsequently encounter unexpected events which delay their completion beyond the end of March 2015.  However, DECC very clearly has taken on board the industry’s practical objections around the evidence to be provided by those that are eligible for the grace period and has accommodated its evidential requirements to the realities of the industry.

Further consultation

In response to comments from consultees that early closure of the RO to large-scale solar would create a “cliff-edge” effect for some projects, DECC has put out a further consultation (closing on 24 October 2014) on the proposal that there should be a separate 3 month grace period (until 30 June 2015) for projects which are prevented from meeting the 31 March 2015 deadline only because they are not connected to the grid by that date.

The proposal is that such projects would have to include in their RO application:

  • a grid connection offer and acceptance and a letter from the network operator estimating or setting a date for connection of no later to 31 March 2015 (the estimated connection date);
  • a declaration by the developer that to the best of its knowledge, the project would have been commissioned by 31 March 2015 if the connection had been made by the estimated connection date; and
  • a letter from the network operator confirming that in its opinion, the failure to make the grid connection before the estimated connection date was not due to any failure on the part of the developer.

The first of these proposed requirements is open to the same sorts of objections that were made by the industry against the proposed requirement for a letter from the network operator that formed part of the May 2014 proposals.  However, DECC insists that past experience on banding review grace periods suggests that the difficulties associated with it are “not insurmountable”, and the response to consultation is careful to note that the requirement has been removed from the final policy decision on the May proposals because a letter from the network operator was considered unnecessary in that context, rather than that it would be too difficult to obtain.

What next?

DECC intends to implement the policy decisions described above in relation to RO closure through an amendment to the Renewables Obligation Closure Order 2014, to take effect on 1 April 2015.

DECC is evidently determined to do whatever it has to in order to mitigate the risk that the growth in large-scale solar PV will lead to a breach in the Levy Control Framework limits. It wants the sector to switch to the CfD regime, where the auction-based allocation process will drive down the costs of subsidy, acknowledging that the greater complexity of the CfD regime will favour the larger players in the industry.

The deadline for applications for the first CfD round is now 30 October 2014, and in recent publications both DECC and National Grid (as EMR Delivery Body) have been doing their best to make the regime user-friendly.  The table below suggests which groups of developers may need to consider making a CfD application.  If onshore wind developers (with whom solar projects must compete) are likely to avoid bidding for CfDs in the first auction since they  have until 31 March 2017 to achieve RO accreditation, it may be that solar projects stand a reasonable chance of success of being allocated CfDs later this year.

table-2

At present, for those who miss out on both the RO and a CfD from the first allocation round, the next opportunity would be a CfD allocation round in Autumn 2015.  DECC has given some indications that it is sympathetic to the proposition that the rapid development cycle of solar projects means that there ought to be solar CfD allocations every 6 months rather than every year, as for other technologies, but it also points out that more frequent auctions would not mean any increase in the overall budget.  And since 2015 is a General Election year, no promises of a further allocation round for solar can be made at present.

 

 

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Early closure of RO to >5MW solar PV projects confirmed

Worth the wait? DECC responds to RO / CfD consultations

In July and November last year, DECC consulted on the transition period between the introduction of the Contracts for Difference (CfD) regime under Electricity Market Reform (EMR) later this year and the closure of the Renewables Obligation (RO) to new generating capacity at the end of March 2017.  The response to these consultations was published earlier this week, just as Spring came to London.  Some of the policy decisions it sets out will already have been apparent to careful students of the draft Renewables Obligation (Amendment) Order 2014 that was published and laid before Parliament last month with an accompanying  written ministerial statement, but the response provides an opportunity to see DECC’s approach to RO / CfD transition issues in the round, with a fuller set of explanations.

Botticelli’s “Spring”: spot the connections between the picture and this post!

The transition period

The transition period begins once the CfD regime is live.  No firm date is given for this, but the response refers to 31 October 2014 as the date when CfD applications are expected to open.  It also says Government does not expect applications for CfDs to be open in advance of State Aid clearance. 

Choice of scheme

During the transition period, developers will be able to apply for accreditation under the RO or for a CfD or Investment Contract (if they meet the relevant eligibility criteria).  When they make their applications, they will be required to make various declarations: for example, if they are applying for a CfD, to declare that they are not supported under the RO.  A developer who is unsuccessful in relation to an application under one scheme will be able to apply under the other. 

A developer whose Investment Contract is terminated for certain reasons relating to State Aid, or to possible amendments to the Investment Contract in the light of the standard terms for CfDs will be able to apply for RO accreditation.  But a developer who withdraws an RO or CfD application or refuses a CfD or RO accreditation will not be able to apply under the other scheme: so, you cannot, for example, bid for a CfD, decide that you don’t like the strike price (e.g. in a “pay as clear” regime), and decide to retreat to the perceived safety of the RO instead. 

The level of the RO (i.e. the extent of the obligation on electricity suppliers to purchase ROCs) will continue to be set by 1 October, rather than being pushed back to being decided by 1 February.  Whilst effectively acknowledging that the likely launch of the CfD regime in the later part of this year will complicate the task of setting the RO level at the same time, Government has been persuaded that moving to a February deadline would mean that suppliers had to rely on their own internal RO forecasts when pricing supply contracts, resulting in the addition of a risk premium which would increase consumer bills.  The status quo was therefore preferred.

Dual Scheme Facilities

Additional capacity added to an RO accredited project will be eligible for registration under the RO if no application for a CfD has been made in respect of the project.  However, additional capacity of 5MW or less added to RO accredited stations after 31 March 2017 will not be eligible for RO or FiT support.  On the basis of the representations made to it, DECC does not seem to believe that there is a significant class of potential ≤5MW extensions to existing RO-accredited projects which would not be able to go ahead without an extension of the RO deadline (or FiT support) beyond March 2017. Although, between 2006 and 2012, 131MW of the 190MW of additional capacity accredited in respect of existing projects was ≤5MW, 103MW was for landfill and sewage gas sites: analysis of this sector suggests that existing sites have added most of the extra capacity they can, and DECC do not expect many new sites to be developed under the RO.  Finally, increases in capacity resulting from station refurbishment or unit replacement after the closure date will not be eligible for support under the RO.

On the other hand, projects which are developed in phases may find themselves with part of their capacity accredited under the RO and part being the subject of a CfD.  In such cases there will need to be separate metering and fuel data collection for the two parts of the project, so as to make sure that plants do not claim ROCs / CfD payments in respect of capacity which is not entitled to them.  As DECC puts it, “preventing arbitrage opportunities between the two schemes and ensuring accuracy, is crucial to minimise the impact on consumer bills”.  DECC also take the view that the dual scheme arrangements should not be available to RO-accredited projects which wish to add less than 5MW of extra capacity funded by a CfD, as it would give rise to an “unjustified” and “disproportionate administrative impact in relation to the amount of additional generation produced”.

Grandfathering

The July consultation included some proposals about grandfathering, with particular reference to biomass co-firing.  The response reports “widespread misunderstanding” of these proposals, which DECC concludes “were too confusing and administratively complicated to take forward” and “would have had little genuine impact in terms of budgetary stability”.  Further proposals in this area may be consulted on “later in the spring or summer”.

Grace periods

The grace periods are a set of four exceptions to the rule that the RO closes to new capacity on 31 March 2017: projects which reach the stage at which RO accreditation could have been given within a certain period after that date will be allowed to be accredited in certain circumstances.  A project that is in a position to benefit from two or more of these exceptions will only be permitted to benefit from one, but (subject to the eligibility rules) has a free choice in deciding which one it will benefit from.

  • New or additional capacity which is delayed by a failure to resolve issues with radar or to establish a grid connection will have a 12 month grace period.  In the case of grid delays, there must be evidence of a grid connection offer made and accepted and a network operator having set a date before April 2017 for connecting the project.
  • There will be a 12 month grace period for any project that is awarded a FID Enabling Investment Contract if that contract is terminated either for reasons relating to state aid or because the developer exercises a right to terminate when changes are made or proposed to it in the light of the CfD standard terms.   
  • A 12 month grace period will be available to a class of ACT or offshore wind projects which are scheduled to commission close to 31 March 2017 and have been identified as at risk of investment hiatus.  These projects are expending funds but are unwilling to commit to the CfD regime because elements of it are still uncertain.  The deadline for applications for this grace period will be 31 October 2014 – i.e. about the time when applications for CfDs are expected to open.  DECC rejected suggestions of a later deadline “as it could give projects which could have applied for a CfD shortly after applications open an incentive to enter the RO instead”.  Of course, it may be that by requiring developers to apply for the grace period before the outcome of the first CfD allocation round is apparent, DECC will simply guarantee that they opt for the RO, but DECC’s thinking seems to be partly that it is targeting projects that ought to be commissioned before 31 March 2017 and making sure that this happens by giving them the confidence to proceed, in the knowledge that the grace period provides them with a safety net.  By way of evidence that they are sufficiently advanced to be eligible for this grace period, developers will have to produce a grid connection offer, a letter from the network operator indicating that connection will take place before April 2017, planning consent (the conditions of which need not have been discharged) and land use rights or an option to acquire them.  They will also have to produce a director’s certificate confirming that the developer will have sufficient resources to commit to the project and that it is expected to commission before April 2017.  Various forms of more detailed evidence of “substantial financial commitment” towards the project were considered and rejected as “too restrictive, too unclear or too sensitive”. 
  • DECC begins discussion of the final grace period by observing that “dedicated biomass projects have in some cases been delayed while detailed Government policy arrangements in relation to the 400MW cap were put into place”.  Dedicated biomass projects allocated an unconditional place within the cap will therefore be offered an 18 month grace period, regardless of whether they are CHP or not.  However, this grace period will not be available for additional capacity.

Further measures for biomass

Generating stations which co-fire biomass and are RO-accredited but have never claimed ROCs under the biomass conversion support band will be permitted to apply for a CfD or Investment Contract as biomass conversions, and leave the RO if they are successful.  If the operator gets cold feet about its CfD before reaching the CfD “Start Date”, it will be able to revert to the RO.  However, DECC has not yet decided whether an operator which finds itself in this position with respect to only some of the units in a generating station would still be entitled to claim ROCs at the conversion band for units in respect of which it has not previously fired or claimed this level of support.

Biomass co-firing stations which are supported by the RO will be permitted to bid into the EMR Capacity Market, leaving the RO if they are successful in their bid.

Offshore wind

Offshore wind projects accredited under the RO when it closes will be permitted to commission their remaining phases under (i) the RO, (ii) the CfD or (iii) both regimes, provided that they “inform Ofgem by 31 March 2017 “whether they intend to take up the RO option” in relation to any of those phases.  Option (iii) is expected to be a minority interest.  RO and CfD phases “will need to be on entirely separate strings of turbines”, with no connection that enables electricity generated by one string to be exported on another.  

Replacement of ROCs with Fixed Price Certificates

The July consultation opened up the possibility that the transition from the current ROC regime to a system of fixed price certificates (FPCs) might be brought forward to coincide with the closure of the RO to new capacity in 2017 rather than taking place in 2027 as originally proposed.  However, DECC intends to stick to the original plan, because consultees did not persuade it that ROC values are likely to fall below the buyout price or that a significant oversupply of ROCs is likely to occur.  

What next?

The implementation of most of these policies will be spread across the RO (Amendment) Order mentioned above (intended to come into fore on 1 April 2014) and the RO Closure Order (due to be laid before Parliament in May and come into fore in July 2014).  “Some remaining transition policy issues, such as those relating to interaction between the RO and the Capacity Market” will be dealt with in an RO Consolidated Order to be made “later in 2014/15”.

Comments

In a world where there is no perfect answer and the most important thing is for developers to know where they stand, DECC’s consultation response is to be welcomed.  It bears the hallmarks of  evidence-based policy making and shows a proper degree of engagement with what consultees had to say as well as a willingness to interrogate critically the representations that they made.  

Overall, the response appears to take a slightly tougher line than is sometimes found on what DECC evidently sees as unjustified special pleading in some areas.  This, and a recurrent emphasis in the response on controlling costs, make sense both in domestic political terms and from the point of view of clearing these policies with the European Commission under the state aid rules.  

The response is perhaps a little more favourable on balance to biomass developers than some of DECC’s publications on biomass of last year, whilst emphasising its transitional status.

DECC has tried to keep things simple at a number of points.  However, the detail of what must be done in order to be eligible to make particular choices is inevitably quite intricate.  Developers will need to think carefully about how to integrate transition and grace period decision-points and criteria, as well as the various steps in RO and CfD procedures, into their own project plans.

As ever with EMR, some big questions remain.  Perhaps the biggest in this case is whether the flexibility to move between the RO and CfD regimes will encourage those who are able to choose either regime to opt for a CfD in preference to the RO.  If it does not, there must be a risk that the RO’s share of Levy Control Framework funding (see the table below, based on DECC figures) will continue to dominate UK renewables subsidies to a greater extent and for a longer period than to be comforably consistent with either the ultimate goals of EMR or the European Commission’s policies on state aid for renewables schemes.

£m 2011/2012 prices 2015/2016 2016/2017 2017/2018 2018/2019
  £ % £ % £ % £ %
Levy Control Framework Cap: RO + FIT + CfD 4,300 100 4,900 100 5,600 100 6,450 100
Committed FIT expenditure(estimated) 760 18 760 15 760 14 760 12
Committed RO expenditure(estimated) 2,900 67 2,790 57 2,790 50 2,790 43
Projected new FIT expenditure 40 1 130 3 200 4 260 4
Renewables Investment Contracts (maximum) 260 6 450 9 720 13 1,010 16
New RO projects, other CfDs 340 8 770 16 1,130 20 1,630 25

 

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Worth the wait? DECC responds to RO / CfD consultations

State aid for Hinkley Point C (2): Outline of the Commission’s analysis

This is the second in a series of posts on the European Commission’s initial assessment of the package of measures by which the UK Government proposes to provide financial support for the proposed new nuclear generating station at Hinkley Point (HPC): click here for the first in the series.  The text of Commission’s letter is now also available in the Official Journal of the European Union: interested parties have one month from the date of its publication (7 March 2014) to comment.   

In this post we summarise the Commission’s analysis of the HPC support package.  This consists chiefly of a proposed Contract for Difference (CfD) and a credit guarantee conferred by participation in HM Treasury’s UK Guarantees Scheme: both are conveniently summarised in the opening paragraphs of the Official Journal notice.

Introduction: the state aid rules

It is worth beginning by reminding ourselves of the key EU Treaty provisions on state aid.  Article 107 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) states:

1. Save as otherwise provided in the Treaties, any aid granted by a Member State or through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods shall, in so far as it affects trade between Member States, be incompatible with the internal market.

Article 107(2) then lists certain types of aid which fall within Article 107(1) but which “shall” be considered compatible with the internal market.  These relate to aid having a social character or relating to natural disasters, economic crises or German unification and can therefore be disregarded for present purposes.  Article 107(3) contains a further list of types of aid which “may” be considered compatible with the internal market.  Article 108(2) and (3) TFEU state:

2. If, after giving notice to the parties concerned to submit their comments, the Commission finds that aid granted by a State or through State resources is not compatible with the internal market having regard to Article 107, or that such aid is being misused, it shall decide that the State concerned shall abolish or alter such aid within a period of time to be determined by the Commission.

If the State concerned does not comply with this decision within the prescribed time, the Commission or any other interested State may, in derogation from the provisions of Articles 258 and 259, refer the matter to the Court of Justice of the European Union direct…

3. The Commission shall be informed, in sufficient time to enable it to submit its comments, of any plans to grant or alter aid. If it considers that any such plan is not compatible with the internal market having regard to Article 107, it shall without delay initiate the procedure provided for in paragraph 2. The Member State concerned shall not put its proposed measures into effect until this procedure has resulted in a final decision.

Secondary legislation has established an administrative framework for dealing with state aid cases (for further detail, click here).  Measures that are put into effect without having been notified and approved under Article 108(3) are “unlawful aid”.  If the Commission finds unlawful aid is incompatible with the internal market, it may require Member States to recover it from the beneficiaries.

To gain the Commission’s approval for the HPC package, the UK Government must therefore persuade the Commission either that its support for HPC does not constitute state aid within the meaning of Article 107(1), or that such support is compatible with the internal market.  The Government has identified three possible ways to avoid a finding of incompatibility, as set out below.

The “no aid” arguments

Any claim that a measure does not constitute state aid depends on showing that one of the elements of aid set out in Article 107(1) – state origin of the aid, conferral of a “selective advantage”, impacts on intra-EU trade and competition – is not present.  We take each of these in turn below as they have been applied to the HPC support package.

  • Apparently, the UK authorities “do not contest” that the CfD is financed from resources under the control of the state.  The Commission points out that the CfD will be administered by a Counterparty body essentially controlled, and potentially underwritten, by the Secretary of State.
  • As regards distortion of competition and an effect on intra-EU trade, the Commission observes: “As in this case the notified measures will enable the development of a large level of capacity which might otherwise have been the object of private investment by other market operators using alternative technologies from either the UK or other Member States, the notified measures can affect trade between Member States and distort competition.”.
  • That leaves as the key battleground the question of whether the support package confers a “selective advantage” on HPC.  Would HPC be getting a deal that will give it an advantage in the market and that is not open to its competitors?  In order to show that this element of the definition of aid is made out, the Commission has to engage with the criteria laid down by the Court of Justice in the case of Altmark.  In that case, the Court found that in certain circumstances compensation provided to undertakings entrusted with a public service function would not constitute state aid.  The Commission considers the Altmark criteria (discussed in the Commission’s 2012 Communication on compensation for the provision of services of general economic interest (SGEI)) in some detail.  Overall, the Commission finds it hard to see that HPC would be entrusted with the kind of public service obligation (PSO) that the Altmark criteria envisage.  It also inclines to the view that the compensation which HPC stands to receive under the CfD would be more than the Altmark criteria permit. 

The “aid is compatible” arguments

The Government argues that if the HPC package is considered to be state aid, its contribution to the common EU objectives of decarbonisation, security of supply and diversity of electricity generation, and addressing related market failures, outweighs its negative impact on the internal market.  The Commission is not persuaded by these arguments in favour of a finding of compatibility under Article 107(3).  For example, it is sceptical of claims about decarbonisation on the basis that support for HPC could crowd out investment in other low carbon technologies; and it queries claims about security of supply on the grounds that the most immediate concerns about the adequacy of the UK’s electricity generation capacity relate to the current decade, not the 2020s when HPC would be commissioned.

But the Commission’s scepticism about the objectives of the HPC support package is only the beginning of its concerns from an Article 107(3) point of view.  Even if it were prepared to accept that the HPC package is aligned with one of the “common EU objectives”, the Commission queries whether state aid – in the combined form of the proposed CfD and credit guarantee – is needed to enable HPC to achieve these objectives.  Overall, the Commission suspects that the level of protection from ordinary market risks which the support package provides is excessive: more or less every aspect of the package, from the duration of the CfD to the way in which it has been negotiated, is viewed in sceptical terms, so that the Commission concludes by saying that it doubts “whether it effectively addresses a market failure”; questions “whether [it] can be deemed…to be proportionate”; and is “concerned about its distortive effects on competition”.

A “service of general economic interest”?

In between the “no aid” and “compatible aid” limbs of its case, the Government argues that the HPC package with the internal market, fulfils the conditions of the Framework which the Commission has put in place for determining whether larger SGEI schemes fall within Article 106(2) TFEU.   Article 106(2) states:

2. Undertakings entrusted with the operation of services of general economic interest or having the character of a revenue-producing monopoly shall be subject to the rules contained in the Treaties, in particular to the rules on competition, in so far as the application of such rules does not obstruct the performance, in law or in fact, of the particular tasks assigned to them. The development of trade must not be affected to such an extent as would be contrary to the interests of the Union.

Article 106(2) is in some ways the ultimate derogation provision.  It says, in effect, that certain undertakings will be exempt from the requirements of EU competition and state aid law if the application of that law would “obstruct the performance” of a service of general economic interest entrusted to a particular undertaking.  The meaning of Article 106(2) has therefore been the subject of many arguments between the Commission and Member States.

The Commission has, for example, argued that Article 106(2) “authorizes measures contrary to the Treaty only to the extent to which they are necessary to enable the undertaking concerned to perform its task of general economic interest under acceptable economic conditions and, therefore, only if they are necessary for the financial equilibrium of the undertaking itself”.  But the Court of Justice, whilst acknowledging that Article 106(2), like all derogations, must be interpreted strictly, has found that it “seeks to reconcile the Member States’ interest in using certain undertakings, in particular in the public sector, as an instrument of economic or fiscal policy with the Community’s interest in ensuring compliance with the rules on competition and the preservation of the unity of the common market”.  Moreover, Member States “cannot be precluded, when defining the services of general economic interest which they entrust to certain undertakings, from taking account of objectives pertaining to their national policy or from endeavouring to attain them by means of obligations and constraints which they impose on such undertakings”.  As a result, “for the Treaty rules not to be applicable to an undertaking entrusted with a service of general economic interest under Article 90(2) of the Treaty, it is sufficient that the application of those rules obstruct the performance, in law or in fact, of the special obligations incumbent upon that undertaking. It is not necessary that the survival of the undertaking itself be threatened”.  (See Case C-157/94, Commission v Netherlands.)

                                                   

                                                A service of general economic interest

The Commission’s analysis in response to the UK’s SGEI arguments overlaps to a large extent with what it says in relation to the Altmark criteria and/or the Government’s Article 107(3) arguments.  It concludes that the Commission doubts whether the HPC package qualifies as an SGEI within the meaning of Article 106(2) and the Framework, and that even if it did so qualify the Commission doubts that it would comply with the Framework.

Overall characteristics of the Commission’s analysis

In future posts we will examine some of the Commission’s arguments in more detail.  For now, it is worth noting some more general features of the Commission’s appraisal.

  • There is a degree of unevenness about the Commission’s analysis.  It makes some extremely good points and some decidedly weak ones. 
  • There are a number of points when the Commission appears to help the UK by indicating possible ways of correcting what it sees as deficiencies in the HPC package in state aid terms.  Whether these potential “escape routes” are in practice open to the UK Government is another matter.
  • The Commission – intentionally or otherwise – draws attention to a number of places where the HPC package is different from the rest of the CfD regime (or at least the enduring regime for renewables).  Sometimes this is to the latter’s advantage, but not always.  In an ideal world, the whole of the CfD regime would have been worked out in full before being notified together, but it so happens that the first part of the regime that the Commission examines in detail is not entirely typical or representative of the regime as a whole.
  • Inevitably, much of the analysis is somewhat tentative, because details of almost all parts of the package still remain to be fully worked out.

Behind everything lurks the question: how much (or how little) freedom do the EU state aid rules allow Member States to have as regards ensuring that a certain proportion of their electricity generating capacity belongs to a specified technology type? 

 

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State aid for Hinkley Point C (2): Outline of the Commission’s analysis