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The “net zero” debate: UK General Election 2019 (and beyond)

Climate and energy issues are clearly very important to many voters, even if what the parties say on these issues may be unlikely ultimately to be a decisive factor in determining the outcome of the election.

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The “net zero” debate: UK General Election 2019 (and beyond)

Natural Gas Public Company of Cyprus (DEFA) issues request for proposals for €500m LNG import facility

Cyprus’ long standing plans to import gas to the island have taken a big step forward with the release on 5 October 2018 of a request for proposals to design, construct, procure, commission, operate and maintain an LNG import facility at Vasilikos Bay, Cyprus (the Project).

It is interesting to note that (unlike previous tenders for LNG imports to Cyprus) the infrastructure is being tendered for separately to the LNG supply. DEFA expects to issue a request for expressions of interest for LNG supply to the market later this year, with a full RfP to follow in early 2019.

Overview of Project

The RfP divides the Project into three distinct elements:

  • The engineering, procurement and construction of the offshore and onshore infrastructure, including the gas transmission pipeline and associated facilities;
  • The procurement and commissioning of a floating storage and regasification unit (FSRU), through the purchase of an existing FSRU, design and construction of a new-build FSRU, or conversion of an LNG Carrier and, if applicable, provision of a floating storage unit (FSU); and
  • The Operations and Maintenance (O&M) of the infrastructure and FSRU for a period of 20 years.”

The following points are worth drawing out:

  1. the Project must be completed by 30 November 2020;
  2. initially, all gas imported through the facility will be sold on by DEFA to the Electricity Authority of Cyprus (EAC, the state owned electricity company, which owns and operates the Vasilikos power station adjacent to the proposed site of the facility). The Vasilikos plant is currently running on heavy fuel oil, but will burn gas once the Project is complete.
  3. DEFA has incorporated a special purpose vehicle, Natural Gas Infrastructure Company of Cyprus, for the Project. The SPV will contract with the successful bidder for the construction and O&M services; and will own the LNG import facility once constructed;
  4. DEFA will contract directly with suppliers for the LNG supply; and will acquire capacity in the facility from the SPV. The risk allocation between the various agreements that will need to be entered into between DEFA, the SPV, the LNG supplier and EAC will be a critical issue for the success of the project.
  5. DEFA will have an option to take over certain elements of the offshore and onshore O&M services at different stages of the Project;
  6. as part of the onshore infrastructure, the contractor will be required to install a “natural gas buffer solution”. The design of this piece of infrastructure is left for the contractor to propose, but could for example include a pipeline array. The intention behind this requirement is to ensure that the FSRU and pipeline infrastructure is capable of achieving the flexibility of gas supply required to meet the operational requirements of the Vasilikos plant.

Funding

The Project has an approved budget of €300m for the initial capex, and €200m for O&M costs over the 20 year term. The initial capex will be part funded by an EU grant under the Connecting Europe Facility, with the remainder expected to be funded wholly or in part by debt finance. It is not yet clear whether EAC will invest equity into the Project – reference is made to EAC taking up to a 30% interest in the SPV at a later date.

Key issues

From our team’s experience of working on similar projects in Cyprus, key issues for the success of the Project may include:

  1. credit support to be provided by Cyprus stakeholders (DEFA / EAC / the government) and the successful bidder. It is interesting to note that the government of Cyprus will be issuing a government guarantee to support the debt financing;
  2. the possibility (and timing) of DEFA selling gas to other buyers in the future, and the implications for EAC’s gas take from the facility;
  3. EAC’s ability to pass through the costs it incurs by generating electricity from gas to electricity consumers under the Cypriot regulatory regime;
  4. the flexibility of gas supply required to meet the operational requirements of the Vasilikos plant (see the previous comments regarding the buffer solution). This will be particularly important given the expected trend towards increased levels of renewable generation and consequential impact on required flexibility of thermal plants on the system;
  5. the impact of additional delivery points for piped gas to other buyers/plants;
  6. the expected timeframe for the conversion of the Vasilikos plant’s turbines to gas, and commissioning of the gas-firing equipment;
  7. impact of any electricity system operator requirements – e.g. regarding new electricity market rules in Cyprus.

Dentons: Cyprus / LNG experience

Dentons has unparalleled experience of working on LNG projects in Cyprus, having advised DEFA for a number of years on the potential long term import of LNG to Cyprus, and subsequently on shorter term interim gas supply arrangements; and MECIT on the commercialisation of the Aphrodite Field in the Cyprus EEZ through the development of a proposed onshore LNG liquefaction and export project at Vasilikos.

The team has a particular focus in advising on international LNG import projects. Team members are advising, or have advised on, LNG import projects in Ghana, the Caribbean, Jamaica, Pakistan, Jordan and Malta.

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Natural Gas Public Company of Cyprus (DEFA) issues request for proposals for €500m LNG import facility

Must FERC weigh GHG emissions in pipeline reviews?

In the 2004 case of U.S. Department of Transportation v. Public Citizen,[1] the Supreme Court established an important limiting principle under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) on the extent to which a federal agency must consider indirect environmental effects in completing NEPA-required reviews of planned agency action. It held that unless an agency has statutory authority categorically to prevent a particular environmental effect, its order cannot be viewed as a legally relevant cause of that effect, thus relieving it of any obligation to gather or consider information on the effect.[2]

As in Public Citizen, this principle often comes into play where the actions of two or more governmental agencies have a role in potentially “causing” a particular environmental effect. If the agency with NEPA responsibilities lacks statutory authority categorically to prevent the indirect effect, it has no obligation to evaluate it under NEPA.[3]

Public Citizen receives substantial play in the orders of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) authorizing pipeline and gas infrastructure under Sections 3 and 7 of the Natural Gas Act (NGA).[4] As the shale gas boom and accompanying buildout of increased gas-fired power generation and LNG export capability have spurred unprecedented demand for new pipelines and gas infrastructure in recent years, they also have sparked unprecedented opposition to gas infrastructure projects by well-organized and well-funded environmental groups like the Sierra Club promoting a climate change/renewable energy agenda.

Such opposition leans heavily on challenges to the sufficiency of the Commission’s reviews under NEPA, giving special emphasis to the claim that, in evaluating new pipeline projects to serve power generation load, FERC must consider the effects on climate change of greenhouse gas emissions (GHG) from the end use of the gas in the power plants served by the pipeline.

Relying on Public Citizen, FERC for the most part[5] has not attempted to quantify such indirect environmental effects, maintaining that its authorization of a pipeline is not the legally relevant cause of the GHG emissions resulting from downstream consumption of natural gas in power plants.

The D.C. Circuit Panel Decision in Sabal Trail

But in the recent case of Sierra Club v. FERC,[6] the majority of a panel of the D.C. Circuit disagreed. In reviewing FERC’s authorization of the Sabal Trail Pipeline designed to serve new gas-fired power plants in Florida, the panel held that the GHG emissions from the power plants are an indirect effect of FERC’s order approving the pipeline and that “because FERC could deny a pipeline certificate on the ground that the pipeline would be too harmful to the environment, the agency is a ‘legally relevant cause’ of the direct and indirect environmental effects of pipelines it approves. Public Citizen thus did not excuse FERC from considering these indirect effects.” [7]

The panel vacated and remanded FERC’s order authorizing construction and operation of the pipeline, pending FERC’s completion and review of the additional environmental studies on the power plant GHG emissions.[8]

In a strong dissent, Judge Janice Rogers Brown disputed the majority’s application of Public Citizen. Relying chiefly on a trilogy of recent D.C. Circuit decisions that had rejected the need for FERC to undertake NEPA consideration of downstream GHG emissions in its authorization of LNG export terminals,[9] Judge Brown pointed out that in those cases: “we held the occurrence of a downstream environmental effect, contingent upon the issuance of a license from another agency with the sole authority to authorize the source of those downstream effects, cannot be attributed to the Commission; its actions ‘cannot be considered a legally relevant cause of the effect for NEPA purposes.'”[10]

While the downstream effects in the LNG terminal cases were contingent on DOE’s authorizing exports of natural gas, the downstream effects in Sabal Trail were contingent upon authorization of the construction and operation of the power plants by the Florida Power Plant Siting Board, a duly authorized agency of the state of Florida with exclusive authority over the licensing of new power plants in Florida. Without the licensing of the power plants, there would be no power plant operations and no resulting GHG emissions.

Significance of Sabal Trail

Sabal Trail is significant on multiple levels. On a practical level, the vacatur and remand to FERC opens a Pandora’s box of NEPA review for the Commission. Although FERC’s environmental staff has performed upper-bound estimates of GHG emissions from downstream gas use associated with new gas pipeline projects since mid-2016, there are no readily available standards to guide such determinations, and its assessments to date have not been tested on judicial review.

The additional required analysis has the potential not only to further delay an already burdened FERC approval process, but also to inject added complexity in sorting out (i) the proper estimates of GHG emissions to use in determining the impact of using gas in the power plants; (ii) the significance of such GHG emissions, especially since there are no readily available metrics to gauge “significance;” and (iii) whether the Commission  should employ the “Social Cost of Carbon” tool developed by the Obama-era Council on Environmental Quality,[11] now withdrawn by executive order[12] in favor of reliance on the metrics set forth in OMB Circular A-4,[13] to evaluate the impact of the GHG emissions and the benefits and detriments generally of a proposed pipeline project.

These challenges portend greater uncertainty and possibly increased likelihood of error in the commission’s evaluations, potentially heightening investor risk in pipeline projects and dampening deployment of capital in the pipeline sector.

Efforts to reach consensus on the proper response to Sabal Trail in the proceedings on remand have already divided the Commission along party lines. In its March 14, 2018, Order on Remand Reinstating Certificate and Abandonment Authorization, the three-Republican majority adhered to the methodology the Commission environmental staff first introduced in mid-2016, employing upper-bound estimates of GHG emissions with explanations of the inherent difficulty in providing more granular detail. It also declined, as in past orders, to employ the Social Cost of Carbon tool, noting the inherent difficulties of meaningfully employing the Social Cost of Carbon in the Commission’s decision-making.[14]

Lastly, the majority questioned whether the Commission has authority to deny a certificate because of concerns about GHG emissions from the end use of gas, noting that Congress or the executive branch, not the Commission, is responsible for deciding national policy on the end use of natural gas.[15]

The two Democratic Commissioners dissented separately, asserting that the order on remand should have included more granular assumptions in the evaluation of GHG emissions, adopted the Social Cost of Carbon to evaluate both the impact of GHG emissions from downstream gas use and the public convenience and necessity of projects generally, and determined that the impact on climate change of GHG emissions from downstream gas use must be factored into the determination of the public convenience and necessity of a new project.[16]

But far and away, Sabal Trail‘s greatest significance is that the panel majority’s application of Public Citizen does not appear defensible, making the case worthy of U.S. Supreme Court review, especially in light of the current administration’s desire to expedite the authorization and construction of new infrastructure. If Sabal Trail is reviewed and reversed by the Supreme Court, FERC will have a far clearer path through its NEPA process in pipeline certificate cases.

Where the Sabal Trail Panel Majority May Have Gone Wrong

The panel majority appears to have misapplied Public Citizen in two separate respects: (i) on the statutory authority of FERC, in presupposing that the Commission has authority under the NGA to deny a pipeline certificate because of concerns about GHG emissions from the end use of the gas transported by a pipeline, and (ii) on causation, as noted by Judge Brown, in wrongly attributing to FERC causation of GHG emissions by the power plants served by the FERC-authorized pipeline, when a separate state agency had sole authority to license the construction and operation of the power plants that are the source of such emissions, and categorically to prevent such emissions by refusing to issue a license.

Whether FERC has statutory authority to deny a pipeline because of concerns about GHG emissions from power plants served by the pipeline

Although the panel majority correctly articulated the touchstone of Public Citizen that “[a]n agency has no obligation to gather or consider environmental information if it has no statutory authority to act on that information,”[17] it failed to apply that limitation in the context of the Commission’s statutory authority to act on the information claimed to be necessary.

To justify collecting information on downstream power plant emissions, the panel needed first to determine that the Commission has statutory authority to deny a certificate to a new pipeline because of concerns about the effects on climate change of GHG emissions from the power plants proposed to be served by the pipeline. Because the panel majority never addressed that issue, the statutory authority element of Public Citizen is missing.

The proffered justification that “FERC could deny a pipeline certificate on the ground that the pipeline would be too harmful to the environment”[18] is insufficient, as it fails to define FERC’s statutory authority in the context of the specific information sought on downstream GHG emissions from the end use of the gas.

Having no express statutory authority to regulate the end use of gas, the Commission’s power to affect end use in certificate cases derives from its authority under Section 7(e) to determine that a proposed service is required by “the public convenience and necessity.” However, the precedent to date indicates that the Commission’s latitude in exercising such authority is limited, confined to furthering Congress’ purpose in enacting the NGA to assure interstate consumers “an adequate and reliable supply of gas at reasonable prices.”[19]

For example, in the leading case, FPC v. Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp.,[20] the Supreme Court upheld the authority of the Federal Power Commission (FERC’s predecessor) to deny a certificate for the transportation of gas from the Gulf Coast to New York City to alleviate inner-city air pollution because of the Commission’s overriding concerns about the end use of the gas for power generation.

Because other fuels could be readily substituted for natural gas under steam boilers, the Commission  determined that using a wasting resource like gas in power plants was an “inferior use,” whose adverse effects on the availability and price of gas to other interstate consumers would be exacerbated if power plant supply deals like the one proposed in Transco were allowed to proliferate.[21]

Whereas the basis for the Commission’s exercise of authority in Transco can be readily linked to the NGA’s statutory purpose and, as the Supreme Court found in Transco, to Congress’ intent in the 1942 amendments to NGA Section 7 to permit the Commission to take account of the potential “economic waste” of gas in exercising its certificate authority,[22] no such statutory grounding is evident to support the notion of denying a pipeline certificate because of concerns about the effects on climate change of emissions from the end use of the gas transported by the pipeline.

Nowhere does the NGA authorize the Commission to regulate the emissions of downstream gas users, much less establish de facto emissions standards for such users to address climate change through exercise of its authority under Section 7(e) to condition or deny pipeline certificates. Lacking any apparent statutory authority to deny a new pipeline based on GHG emissions by downstream gas users, it appears that the Commission had no obligation under NEPA to gather or consider information on power plant GHG emissions in authorizing the Sabal Trail Pipeline.

Whether authorization to operate the pipeline or authorization to operate the power plants is the legally relevant cause of the GHG emissions from the power plants

Judge Brown’s dissent correctly explains why Public Citizen requires that FERC’s certificate order not be found the “legally relevant” cause of the GHG emissions of the power plants served by the Sabal Trail Pipeline. Instead, as Judge Brown explained, the legally relevant cause is the authorization granted by the Florida Power Plant Siting Board to construct and operate the power plants.

Simply put, the GHG emissions are the byproduct of power plant operations and would not occur separate and apart from the licensing of the power plants by the Florida Power Plant Siting Board. And only the Siting Board, not FERC, has the legal authority to prevent such operations. True, the denial of a FERC certificate could make power plant operations more difficult, but it would not affect the legal authority of the owners to continue operations using other supplies of natural gas or alternative fuels to run the generating equipment.

In these circumstances, the chain of causation as to the Commission’s responsibility is broken, meaning that the GHG emissions cannot be attributed to its action. Accordingly, it was not required to consider the indirect effects of GHG emissions from operation of the power plants in its review of the pipeline certificate application under NEPA.

Lastly, to end where we started, Public Citizen is on point. The issue there was whether the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) was required to consider the environmental effects of increased truck traffic between the U.S. and Mexico in instituting its truck inspection program following President Clinton’s lifting of the moratorium on the entry of Mexican trucks into the US. Because the FMCSA lacked statutory authority categorically to prevent the cross-border operations of Mexican trucks, the court determined that it was not the relevant cause of such environmental effects.

Similarly, in Sabal Trail, the issue is whether FERC must consider the environmental effects from the operation of power plants served by a gas pipeline in authorizing the pipeline. By the reasoning of Public Citizen, because FERC lacks the statutory authority categorically to prevent the operation of such power plants, it cannot be viewed as the legally relevant cause of the environmental effects of such operations.

Conclusion

Reversal of Sabal Trail will help to restore rationality to the NEPA review process for new gas pipelines. The panel majority’s suggestion that a new pipeline “causes” new power plants served by the pipeline reverses the commercial reality of project development, putting the fuel supply cart before the market demand horse as the determinant of new pipeline expansions. The fact is that new pipelines do not get proposed or built without market demand for the gas proposed to be transported.

Reversal will also restore restraint in the conception of FERC’s statutory authority to act in the “public convenience and necessity” under NGA Section 7(e). As Transco suggests, FERC’s authority to affect the end use of gas is limited to actions related to advancing the NGA’s statutory purpose; it does not include the power to control directly or indirectly the GHG emissions of downstream end users of gas. Not that control of such emissions is not important or is in some way affected with the “public interest” — it is just that Congress or other agencies, not FERC, have the authority to regulate them.

Lastly, reversal will restore a sensible understanding of Public Citizen. As Judge Brown points out, where another agency has the authority categorically to prevent the GHG emissions from power plants served by a new pipeline by refusing to issue the license for construction and operation of the power plants, FERC’s more limited action in authorizing a pipeline to serve the power plants cannot be viewed as a legally relevant cause of such emissions.

Such recognition of FERC’s authority as limited will also extend comity to requisite state and federal agency actions in the integrated resource planning of new power generation at the state level and the air permitting process at the state and federal levels for GHG and other emissions from power plant operations.

The original version of this article was published by Law360.  James M. Costan is a partner in Dentons’ energy practice. Jay represents clients on a wide range of public utility and energy matters, including energy transactions and federal and state regulation of the sale and transmission of electricity, natural gas and LNG and the licensing of energy projects.  The opinions expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the firm, its clients, or Portfolio Media Inc., or any of its or their respective affiliates. This article is for general information purposes and is not intended to be and should not be taken as legal advice.

[1] 541 U.S. 752 (2004) (Public Citizen).

[2] Id. at 767-69.

[3] Sierra Club v. FERC, 827 F.3d 36, 49 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (Freeport).

[4] 15 U.S.C. §§ 717b and 717f.

[5] In mid-2016, FERC environmental staff started preparing “upper-bound” estimates of GHG emissions from downstream gas use to support NEPA reviews. Such estimates assume that the full delivery capacity of the pipeline will be consumed 24/7 for gas-fired power generation.

[6] 867 F.3d 1357 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (Sabal Trail).

[7] Id. at 1373 (citations omitted).

[8] The vacatur and remand had minimal effect on pipeline operations, because most construction had been completed by the time of the D.C. Circuit’s decision in late August 2017. Thereafter, issuance of the mandate was held in abeyance pending completion of the rehearing process in late January and then was stayed until late March, affording FERC sufficient time to complete a supplemental environmental impact statement and issue an order reinstating the Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity on March 14, 2018. Florida Southeast Connection LLC, 162 FERC ¶ 61,233 (2018) (Order on Remand).

[9] Freeport, supra; Sierra Club v. FERC, 827 F.3d 59 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (Sabine Pass); Earth Reports Inc. v. FERC, 828 F.3d 949 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (Earth Reports).

[10] Sabal Trail, 867 F.3d at 1381 (Judge Brown dissenting), quoting Freeport, 827 F.3d at 47, Sabine Pass, 827 F.3d at 68; and Earth Reports, 828 F.3d at 952.

[11] See 81 Fed. Reg. 51866 (Aug. 5, 2016), Final Guidance for Federal Departments and Agencies on Consideration of Greenhouse Gas Emissions and the Effects of Climate Change in National Environmental Policy Act Reviews, available at https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2016/08/05/2016-18620/final-guidance-for-federal-departments-and-agencies-on-consideration-of-greenhouse-gas-emissions-and.

[12] See 82 Fed. Reg. 16576 (April 5, 2017), Withdrawal of Final Guidance for Federal Departments and Agencies on Consideration of Greenhouse Gas Emissions and the Effects of Climate Change in National Environmental Policy Act Reviews, available at https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2017/04/05/2017-06770/withdrawal-of-final-guidance-for-federal-departments-and-agencies-on-consideration-of-greenhouse-gas.

[13] https://www.transportation.gov/sites/dot.gov/files/docs/OMBW020Circular0/020No.0/020A-4.pdf.

[14] Order on Remand at PP 22-51.

[15] Id. at P 29.

[16] Id. (separate dissents of Commissioners LaFleur and Glick).

[17] Sabal Trail, 867 F.3d at 1372, citing Public Citizen, 541 U.S. at 767-68.

[18] Id. at 1373.

[19] E.g., California v. Southland Royalty Co., 436 U.S. 519, 523 (1978); NAACP v. FPC, 425 U.S. 662, 669-70 (1976).

[20] 365 U.S. 1 (1961) (Transco).

[21] Similar concerns about the need to husband gas supply for high priority end uses drove the Commission ‘s directive that pipelines institute end-use curtailment plans to address the nationwide gas shortage in the 1970s. See FPC v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 406 U.S. 621 (1972).

[22] Transco, 365 U.S. at 10-22.

 

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Must FERC weigh GHG emissions in pipeline reviews?

CJEU rules on validity of natural resources agreements

On 27 February 2018 the CJEU issued its judgment in the Western Sahara Campaign case (Case C-266/16). In a short judgment, the court held that the 2006 partnership agreement in the fisheries sector (Fisheries Agreement) and a 2013 protocol to that agreement are inapplicable to the territory of Western Sahara. This was because including Western Sahara within the scope of these agreements would be contrary to “rules of general international law applicable in relations between the EU and Morocco”, particularly the principle of self-determination, and to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea.

Why are we writing about fish in an Energy blog? As we explained in an earlier post on this case, the international law principles on which it turns are potentially relevant to other agreements about natural resources in areas where local populations claim rights of self-determination.

By interpreting the Fisheries Agreement and the 2013 protocol in this way, the CJEU did not have to determine whether agreements that did deal with resources in Western Sahara would be valid under EU and international law (a question Advocate General Wathelet answered in the negative). Nevertheless, the court’s willingness to invoke and apply international law principles, in particular that of self-determination, is an interesting demonstration of the possible impact of those principles. This may well be of broader importance with regard to agreements that purport to deal with other territories whose populations assert – or may in future assert and gain support for – the right to self-determination.

The court’s judgment relies heavily on its December 2016 judgment in Polisario (Case C-104/16), issued after the request for a preliminary ruling was made in Western Sahara. In Polisario, the court had held that the Euro-Mediterranean “association” agreement (the Association Agreement), as well as a Liberalisation Agreement (concerning liberalisation measures on agricultural and fishery products) had to be interpreted, in accordance with international law, as not applicable to the territory of Western Sahara. The Association Agreement and Liberalisation Agreement were initially also included in the Western Sahara reference, but in light of Polisario those aspects were withdrawn by the English High Court.

When interpreting the scope of the Fisheries Agreement and the 2013 protocol, AG Wathelet had considered that, unlike the agreements addressed in Polisario, the Fisheries Agreement and the 2013 protocol were applicable to Western Sahara and its adjacent waters. He reached this view on several bases, finding it was “manifestly established” that the parties intended the agreements to include Western Sahara, that their subsequent agreements and actions were consistent with this interpretation, and that it was also supported by the genesis of the agreements and previous similar agreements.

The court took a different view (without reference to the AG’s Opinion). First, noting the Fisheries Agreement is stated to be applicable to “the territory of Morocco”, the court held that this concept should be construed as meaning “the geographical area over which the Kingdom of Morocco exercises the fullness of the powers granted to sovereign entities by international law, to the exclusion of any other territory, such as that of Western Sahara”. It stated that, if Western Sahara were to be included within the scope of the agreement, that would be “contrary to certain rules of general international law that are applicable in relations between [the EU and Morocco], namely the principle of self-determination”.

The Fisheries Agreement also refers to “waters falling within the sovereignty or jurisdiction” of Morocco. Referring to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, the court noted a coastal state is entitled to exercise sovereignty exclusively over the waters adjacent to its territory and forming part of its territorial sea or exclusive economic zone. Given Western Sahara did not form part of the “territory of Morocco”, the waters adjacent to it equally did not form part of the Moroccan fishing zone referred to in the agreement. A similar conclusion followed with regard to the 2013 protocol’s scope.

While more closely tied to the text of the fisheries agreements than the AG’s Opinion, the judgment suggests the court may seek to arrive at an interpretation of such agreements that respects international law insofar as possible. It is therefore a significant restatement of the importance of international law principles, particularly self-determination, to questions regarding sovereignty over natural resources in occupied territories, and therefore has potential ramifications for international agreements which purport to deal with such resources.

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CJEU rules on validity of natural resources agreements

EU Advocate General restates importance of self-determination to validity of natural resources agreements

In a landmark opinion, Advocate General Wathelet (the AG) of the European Court of Justice (CJEU) has invited the court to conclude that fisheries agreements between the EU and Morocco are in violation of the international law principle of self-determination, and therefore invalid under EU law. It comes as a clear reminder that EU institutions must respect international law principles binding upon them when entering into international agreements.

If the court follows the AG’s lead, the case could have ramifications for other territories whose populations may claim rights to self-determination, such as Catalonia and the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, and for the validity under international law of agreements with the states occupying those territories.

Background

The territory of Western Sahara is occupied by Morocco, a situation widely considered to breach the principles of international law entitling peoples to self-determination. The UN recognises Western Sahara as a non-self-governing territory occupied by Morocco.

The reference to the CJEU emanates from an English court case brought by Western Sahara Campaign UK, an NGO aiming to support the recognition of the Western Saharan people’s right to self-determination. It argues that the EU-Morocco agreements (insofar as they purport to apply to Western Sahara) violate that right and so are contrary to the general principles of EU law and to Article 3(5) of the Treaty on European Union, under which the EU is required to respect international law. Under the agreements, the EU paid Morocco for access to waters including Western Sahara’s.

As the measures in question related to the validity of EU law, the English court referred the case to the CJEU, itself characterising Morocco’s presence in Western Sahara as a “continued occupation”.

The Advocate General’s Conclusions

Article 3(5) of the Lisbon Treaty states that the EU will respect the principles contained in the UN Charter, of which Article 1 sets out the principle of self-determination of peoples, while Article 73 promotes self-government. Yet the EU fisheries agreements with Morocco purport to deal with waters off the coast of Western Sahara.

The AG considered, first, that, where the relevant principles of international law (here, both treaty and customary law forming part of general international law) are “unconditional and sufficiently precise”, a claimant can rely on them to challenge EU actions. He noted that the right of self-determination, because it formed part of the law of human rights, was not subject to these requirements, but in any event met them. Similarly, (i) the principle of permanent sovereignty over natural resources and (ii) the rules of international humanitarian law applicable to the exploitation of Western Sahara’s natural resources were also sufficiently precise and unconditional to be invoked by the NGO.

Examining whether the fisheries agreements breached the international legal principles in play, the AG examined in some detail the historical background to Morocco’s occupation. An advisory opinion issued by the International Court of Justice in 1975 had stated that Western Sahara was not a “territory belonging to no one” at the time of its earlier occupation by Spain. A referendum on self-determination under UN auspices was thus envisaged, but Morocco considered this unnecessary on the basis the population had already de facto determined themselves in favour of returning the territory to Morocco. The AG, however, concluded that Western Sahara was integrated within Morocco “without the people of the territory having freely expressed its will in that respect”.

Because the fisheries agreements with Morocco make no exception for Western Sahara, the AG considered the EU is in breach of its obligation not to recognise an illegal situation resulting from the breach of the right to self-determination, and to refrain from rendering aid or assistance in maintaining that situation.

The AG also emphasised that as “Western Sahara is a non-self-governing territory in the course of being decolonised … the exploitation of its natural wealth comes under Article 73 of the United Nations Charter and the customary principle of permanent sovereignty over natural resources”. He found that the fisheries agreements did not contain the necessary legal safeguards to ensure that the natural resources were used for the benefit of the people of Western Sahara. On that basis also, in his view the provisions of the agreements were not compatible with EU or international law.

Impact of the opinion

It remains to be seen whether the CJEU will follow the AG’s opinion. The opinion is nevertheless significant, not only for the Western Saharan situation. It is a robust restatement of the importance of the right to self-determination, and of the consequences that may flow where it is held to be breached, as well as of the importance of the protection of natural resources in occupied territories.

The arguments set out in this opinion will undoubtedly influence independence discourse in territories as disparate as Catalonia and Kurdistan, and the CJEU’s decision, expected at the end of February, will be keenly anticipated.

The reaffirmation of the principle of permanent sovereignty over natural resources is of particular interest regarding the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, where the exploitation of natural resources has been a contentious issue for decades. Kurdistan’s status as a semi-autonomous region with the right to manage its oil resources is enshrined in Iraq’s 2005 Constitution, and the Region has not declared independence.  Although not analogous with the Western Sahara situation, one can envisage questions being raised as to the compatibility with international law of any agreements which states may have or may enter into with the Iraqi federal government that relate in some way to resources in Kurdistan territory.  It may well be argued that these too fail to respect the Kurdish people’s sovereignty over their natural resources and/or their right to self-determination (as well as potentially breaching the constitutional provisions).  The AG’s comments as to the unconditional and precise nature of these principles paves the way for challenges before national courts on the basis that these are binding upon states, which may not enter into agreements that disregard them.

Case C-266/16 Western Sahara Campaign, Opinion of Advocate General Wathelet, 10 January 2018

The authors are grateful to Seonaid Stevenson, a trainee solicitor at Dentons, for her assistance with this piece.

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EU Advocate General restates importance of self-determination to validity of natural resources agreements

Investors move to secure positions in light of Tanzania natural resources reforms

Investors move to secure positions in light of Tanzania natural resources reforms

Recent measures introduced in the Tanzanian natural resources and mining sectors could have far-reaching implications for the value of investments in the country. As a result of legislation, approved by the National Assembly in early July, companies face the prospect of having to grant a 16 per cent free carried interest to the government, acquisition of up to 50 per cent of the company, increased royalties and forced renegotiation of certain terms.

The reforms are the latest in a campaign to exercise greater control over the extractives sectors. This has already given rise to two new claims by foreign investors since the beginning of July. Those with interests in the country’s mining, oil and gas industries will be closely observing developments, reviewing their contractual investment treaty protections and taking steps to protect their assets and any future claims.

The key provisions of significance to foreign investors are as follows:

Natural Wealth and Resources Contracts (Review and Re-negotiation of Unconscionable Terms) Act 2017

This Act grants the government far-reaching powers to renegotiate contracts relating to any natural resources where they contain what are considered by the National Assembly to be “unconscionable terms”. This power of review extends to contracts predating the Act. Terms that are deemed to be unconscionable include those which:

  • are aimed at restricting the state’s right to exercise sovereignty over its wealth, natural resources and economic activity;
  • restrict the state’s right to exercise authority over foreign investment within the country;
  • are “inequitable and onerous to the State”;
  • grant “preferential treatment” designed to create a “separate legal regime to be applied discriminatorily for the benefit of a particular investor”;
  • deprive the Tanzanian people of the economic benefits derived from natural resources;
  • empower transnational corporations to intervene in Tanzania’s internal affairs;
  • subject the state to the jurisdiction of foreign tribunals or laws.

What might be an unconscionable term is extremely broad – indeed, most recent contracts in which foreign entities are (even indirectly) involved are likely to contain provisions that would be caught. This again evidences the progressive change in policy towards foreign investment, going directly against many of the protections in Tanzania’s 11 bilateral investment treaties (BITs) currently in force.

Changes to the Mining Act 2010

The Written Laws (Miscellaneous Amendments) Act 2017 introduced the requirement that, where a company is carrying out any mining operations under a mining licence or special mining licence, the government shall have a minimum 16 per cent free carried interest in its shares. In addition, it will be entitled to acquire up to 50 per cent of the shares of the company, “commensurate with the total tax expenditures incurred by the Government in favour of the mining company”.

It remains to be seen whether the government will take the 16 per cent free carried interest where operations occur under existing licences, or only where new licences are granted. How the government’s “entitlement” to acquire additional shares will work is equally uncertain. Investors are likely to face difficult strategic decisions over the coming months in light of the risk of seizure of their shares or other assets.

Additionally, this Act increases the royalty rate payable for uranium, gemstones and diamonds from 5 per cent to 6 per cent, and for other metals including gold from 4 per cent to 6 per cent. There is a new requirement that one third of royalties are to be paid by depositing minerals of the equivalent value with the government.

Natural Wealth and Resources (Permanent Sovereignty) Act 2017

This Act provides that the people of Tanzania have permanent sovereignty over all natural wealth and resources, ownership and control of which vests in the government on their behalf. The President is to hold the country’s natural wealth and resources on trust for the people. This in itself may not have an immediate impact upon investments, but again sends a fairly clear message as to the government’s intentions.

Finally, the Act provides that disputes “arising from extraction, exploitation or acquisition and use of natural wealth and resources shall be adjudicated by judicial bodies or other organs established in the United Republic and [in] accordance with laws of Tanzania”.

It is doubtful whether a foreign tribunal considering its jurisdiction under a pre-existing valid arbitration clause would pay regard to this provision. The Act also provides that the jurisdiction of the Tanzanian courts must be acknowledged and incorporated in any “arrangement or agreement” – which may have significant implications for agreeing a forum for disputes outside Tanzania under future agreements.

It is unclear whether the Act intends to attempt to exclude ICSID jurisdiction. However, it would be unlikely to be effective where consent to that jurisdiction has been expressed by Tanzania in BITs (which consent cannot unilaterally be revoked). It should therefore be open to investors still to initiate ICSID arbitration under such treaties.

Impact and potential claims against Tanzania

Against the backdrop of the tightening regime relating to the natural resources sector, two international companies are reported to have commenced arbitration proceedings in as many months.

Two subsidiaries of Acacia Mining started LCIA arbitrations based on their Mineral Development Agreements (MDAs) with Tanzania. The arbitrations followed a ban on mineral exports by the companies imposed following allegations by the state that Acacia had under-reported its exports, amounting to a multi-million-dollar tax evasion. Acacia’s parent company, Barrick Gold, is said to have intervened to attempt to resolve the dispute with the government, and it was reported on 20 October that a settlement deal has been proposed. This would involve Acacia forming a new joint venture with the Tanzanian government to operate three gold mines, with Tanzania receiving a 16% stake in the mines and a 50% share of the profits, as well as a one-off payment of $300million from Acacia.[1]

South African company AngloGold Ashanti also announced earlier this month that it had begun arbitration proceedings against Tanzania, in response to the ability to renegotiate contracts pursuant to the Unconscionable Terms Act. Reports state this was a precautionary step taken by the company to protect its indirect subsidiaries’ agreements with the government in relation to the development and operation of the Geita Gold Mine. This pre-emptive action demonstrates the serious threat the new governmental powers pose to foreign investments.

Whilst the three arbitrations already launched are based on the companies’ contracts, investors with the government should also consider the BIT protections available to them and what claims could be brought before ICSID (with the increased potential for publicity and direct enforcement this entails). Where an applicable BIT contains an umbrella clause (as many of Tanzania’s do), any breach of an Mineral Development Agreement or other contract will also constitute a breach of the BIT, opening the door to ICSID jurisdiction over the dispute.

Even where no contract is in place, the measures threatened may well breach BIT provisions and trigger further claims. Any demand for carried interest without compensation is likely, for instance, to constitute an unlawful expropriation. If this were the case, the investor would usually be entitled to recover the fair market value of the shareholding immediately prior to the expropriation. The same would be true of any additional shares compulsorily acquired for which adequate compensation was not given.

Many of the measures identified may also breach fair and equitable treatment provisions in BITs (which include protection of an investor’s legitimate expectations) and provisions promising treatment no less favourable than that afforded to a state’s own nationals.

Those with interests in Tanzania’s mining, oil and gas industries would be well advised to take all possible steps to protect their investments in light of this legislation and widely anticipated further measures to create yet more state control over the sectors.

[1] “Tanzania takes steps to settle mining dispute”, Global Arbitration Review, 20 October 2017.

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Investors move to secure positions in light of Tanzania natural resources reforms

Price review arbitrations are not all about economics – everyone has to remember the law!

Recently I attended the 3rd Annual Global Arbitration Review (GAR) Live Energy Disputes conference in London.  A stimulating day of discussion about developments in the international energy business closed with a vigorous debate on the following motion: “This house believes that there’s no law in gas pricing arbitration”.

Those supporting the motion focused on the complex commercial and economic exercise arbitrators in a gas pricing dispute must tackle.  In essence, they contended the arbitrators, by reference to current market conditions, try to update the parties’ commercial deal by copying the economic exercise those parties undertook when they agreed their long-term SPA.  In short, arbitrators decide what the parties should have agreed given the current facts.

Those arguing against the motion forcefully reminded the conference that gas and LNG price reviews take place within the legal structure set out in the SPA.  So, interpretation of the scope of the relevant price review clause remains at the heart of the dispute.  Further, any award the arbitrators make in the first price review under the SPA will inevitably impact later reviews under that contract, i.e. applying the law of issue estoppel is often central to pricing disputes.  So, a price review is not just a commercial and economic exercise.

I have some sympathy for both sides’ opinions.  However, while respecting the central role economic arguments play, it is going too far to say there is no law in gas pricing arbitration.

My experience of gas pricing disputes is that most of both sides’ cases focuses on the economic evidence with the independent experts take opposing views on several topics. For example, the state of the relevant market(s) at particular times, what are the competing fuels and, critically, the most apt data and methods for calculating a new price.  As a result the economic issues can dominate the arbitration.  One point of view is that price reviews are intended simply to re-run the economics underlying the parties’ original deal to update the price to reflect current market conditions.

However, most of the audience at the GAR conference did not accept this limited view of gas pricing arbitrations.  Although economic arguments may dictate the arbitration and final hearing, the parties must always present those arguments through the prism of the law.  All the price review arbitrations I have worked on raised difficult questions about interpreting the price review clause.  In my most recent price review, submissions expressly dealt with applying the English Supreme Court’s recent decision in Arnold v Britton to the clause.  I accept the economic evidence may colour how a party chooses to advance its case on the meaning of the price review clause.  Nonetheless, the experts must present their evidence given the instructions they receive upon the exercise the price review clause requires.  Further, ultimately, the tribunal must apply their understanding of the expert evidence to the objective criteria in the clause to decide whether (and, if so, how) the price should change.  Deciding how the price clause is to be interpreted and whether, in the light of two different experts’ opinions, the test it sets is met, are inherently legal exercises.  That is why parties send price reviews to arbitration, not expert determination.  It is also why parties choose lawyers as arbitrators rather than economists, although hopefully lawyers who can understand complex economic evidence.

Finally, it was notable that the moot arbitrators at the GAR conference mentioned issue estoppel as a key reason they could not accept the motion.  Those of us who have worked on second (and later) price reviews will know how important this area of law can be.  The award on a first price review will reverberate through the remaining term of the SPA.  In particular, the tribunal’s interpretation of the price review clause will often bind future tribunals considering price reviews under that SPA.  The second edition of GAR’s Guide to Energy Arbitrations recognises the central role issue estoppel plays in price reviews.  It includes a new chapter that Liz Tout and I have written tackling this subject.  So, perhaps next year, the motion considered at the GAR conference should be: “This house believes contractual interpretation and issue estoppel lie at the heart of disputes under long-term energy contracts”.

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Price review arbitrations are not all about economics – everyone has to remember the law!

New National Oil Companies: 5 things to think about

Following recent discoveries of significant oil and gas reserves in regions with no or limited existing upstream oil and gas activities, many countries have reorganised, or are in the process of reorganising, their oil and gas regulatory regime in preparation for a ramp up in activity – from Cyprus in the East Mediterranean to Kenya, Tanzania and Mozambique in East Africa.

Part of this process of regulatory reform is likely to include a ‘new’ national oil company (“NOC” –  an oil company fully, or majority, owned by a national government) – either a newly established NOC or an existing NOC with greatly expanded roles and responsibilities. In light of this, here are 5 key things for governments and new NOCs to think about.

State participation

Before considering the role of the NOC, the objectives of state participation in oil and gas assets must be clearly identified. These fall under two broad headings:

  • commercial and fiscal objectives, where the aim of the state is to maximise the Government ‘take’, i.e. revenues (almost always either through a production sharing regime or a tax and royalty regime); and
  • other predominantly non-commercial objectives, which can be both symbolic, i.e. the exercise of state control over the disposal of the hydrocarbon resource, and more practical, e.g. the development of local skills and expertise and the promotion of local content in upstream operations.

The approach taken in relation to state participation will significantly influence the roles and responsibilities given to the NOC.

Role of the NOC

The government will need to determine the role it expects the NOC to play in the upstream sector. For example:

  • will the NOC take an interest in all upstream licences / production sharing contracts (“PSCs”)? If so, on what basis (as operator, or as a minority equity investor)?
  • will the NOC be responsible for managing interactions with international oil companies (“IOCs”) on behalf of the government (e.g. evaluating applications for licences / PSCs)?
  • will the NOC act as regulator in respect of the upstream oil and gas sector, or will there be a separate, arm’s length regulator?
  • will the NOC own any infrastructure (e.g. offshore and onshore pipelines that fall outside the licence / PSC area)?
  • what reporting obligations will the NOC have to the government?
  • will the NOC be responsible for marketing the government’s share of production?
  • will the NOC be able to pursue investment opportunities overseas?

In particular, whether the NOC has a minority investor role or an operator role will have a significant impact on the requirements of the NOC in relation to staffing and financing. As a minority investor the NOC’s interests tend to converge with those of the state (i.e. to encourage its partner to actively explore, while ensuring costs are controlled and a high standard of operations is maintained), whereas as an operator, the NOC will be required to have the capability to propose a development plan, raise money and manage a large project.

In addition, political and legal clarity regarding the NOC’s mandate, its source of financing, the activities it can undertake and the revenues it can generate is essential. In many cases it may be advisable for these to be set out in primary legislation, to promote certainty for investors.

Financing

Governments need to ensure that their strategy for state participation in the upstream sector is affordable. This is a particular consideration with new or young NOCs – sources of finance will be limited at the outset because there are little, or no, upstream revenues from production until commercial discoveries are made and developed. The NOC will therefore rely on government funding, including emergency borrowing in times of trouble (e.g. low oil price scenarios).

NOCs need clear revenue streams to meet day-to-day running costs and investment requirements as well as the ability to raise finance, with access to the capital and debt markets. Revenue streams for the NOC are often varied and unreliable. In addition, securing finance at the pre-discovery stage can be difficult. Even if the NOC is carried for its costs by IOCs pre-production, it will still need funding for staffing etc.

Governance

Good governance, transparency and accountability are extremely important. The government must ensure that the NOC has accountability to the state for its performance and its funding by monitoring the NOC’s costs, processes and performances through accounting and financial disclosure and risk management.

Staffing and training

NOCs need the appropriate level of staffing. As well as technical employees, secondary commercial roles as a minority investor may include managing service providers. If the NOC is operator it will also need accountants, marketers, economists and other administrative staff.

Staff will need appropriate skills and training. If, for example, the NOC is required to take on a greater role in the upstream sector, the NOC may not currently have the appropriate level of staff, in terms of numbers and capability. Training and capacity-building is very expensive, especially without proven reserves, so if this is necessary it needs to be taken into account at an early stage.

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New National Oil Companies: 5 things to think about

Extractives companies’ human rights records ranked in Benchmark study

Developments continue apace in human rights responsibilities for businesses. We are seeing persistent implementation of new reporting requirements across EU jurisdictions and beyond, judgments of national courts and international tribunals holding corporations to ever stricter account for their responsibilities in this area and UN negotiations continuing for a global treaty imposing binding international law obligations on businesses.  Staying ahead of the field in this area is crucial.

While the responsibilities imposed by the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (the UNGPs) are not in themselves legally binding, governments’ expectations that companies will step up in this area have been made clear through National Action Plans, parliamentary enquiries and the introduction of “hard” legal requirements, such as under the Modern Slavery Act in the UK.

Now, the Corporate Human Rights Benchmark (CHRB) has ranked 98 of the largest publicly traded companies globally on 100 human rights indicators, focusing on the Extractives, Agricultural and Apparel industries.  These areas were specifically selected because of the high human rights risks they carry, the extent of previous work on the issue, and global economic significance.  41 Extractives companies featured.

The CHRB is a collaboration between investors and a number of business and human rights NGOs. It has emphasised this is a pilot assessment and welcomes input on the methodology used.  The study was compiled from publicly available information, with the selected companies also having the opportunity to submit information to the CHRB.  Companies were given scores for the measures they are taking across six themes, grounded in the framework of the UNGPs:

  • Governance and policy commitments.
  • Embedding respect and human rights due diligence.
  • Remedies and grievance mechanisms.
  • Performance: Company human rights practices.
  • Performance: Responses to serious allegations.
  • Transparency.

The selected companies were then banded according to their overall percentage score.  The performance-related criteria carried greater weight than the policy-based heads, with “Embedding respect and human rights due diligence” and “Company human rights practices” counting for 25% and 20% respectively.

Results skew significantly to the lower bands

There was a wide spread in the participants’ performance, with a small number of clear leaders emerging. No company scored above the 60-69% band, with only three companies falling within that band.  A further three scored 50-59% and 12 scored 40-49%.  48 companies fell within the 20-29% band.

Of the companies in the top band, two were in the Extractives sector; a further six Extractives companies fell within the 40-49% band; 19 scored 20-29% and five were found to trail at less than 19%.

The generally low scores across the three industries may be explained by the fact that the impact of some businesses’ human rights processes may still be filtering through. We should expect that in future years the authors of the survey will adopt a more stringent approach and subject low-scoring businesses to greater criticism.

Gap between policies and performance

On the whole, companies tended to perform more strongly on policy commitments, high-level governance arrangements and the early stages of due diligence. They performed less well on actions such as tracking responses to risks, assessing the effectiveness of their actions, remedying harms and undertaking specific practices linked to key industry risks.  There is often a mismatch between board level measures and their granular implementation, as well as between public responses to serious allegations and taking appropriate action.

Of the Extractives companies surveyed, only six companies scored were given a zero score for their policy commitments, whereas this was the case for 17 companies for “Embedding respect and human rights due diligence” and nine for “Company human rights practices”.

On the policy side, some Extractives companies scored points for emerging practices such as regular discussion at board level of the company’s human rights commitments, linking at least one board member’s incentives to aspects of the human rights policy, and committing not to interfere with activities of human rights defenders, even where their campaigns target the company.

In terms of implementation, some participants explained how human rights risks are integrated into their broader risk management systems, how they monitored their commitments across their global operations and business relationships, and how they had systems in place for identifying and engaging with those potentially affected by their operations.

Companies were also scored for their practices in relation to selected human rights specific to each industry. Those in which the Extractives participants featured included freedom of association and collective bargaining, health and safety, land acquisition, water and sanitation and the rights of indigenous people.

Conclusion

The significant interest in the CHRB since it began its work is unsurprising given it provides an opportunity to demonstrate commitment and progress in this area vis-à-vis competitors. The pilot methodology will be refined and ultimately the CHRB will be produced on an annual basis for the top 500 companies globally.  We expect it to contribute to the continued drive of companies across all sectors to proactively manage human rights risks in their own operations and through their expectations of their business partners.

Extractives companies’ human rights records ranked in Benchmark study

Iran Issues Pre-qualification for Upstream Tenders

Iran is said to be targeting an increase in oil production from 3.85 to 4 million barrels per day by the end of 2016. Iran is also hoping to start export of a new heavy oil, called West Karun, and which is expected to compete with Iraq’s Basra Heavy crude, which has gained a significant market with US and Asian refiners since its launch in 2015.

Iran’s new upstream contract, the Iran Petroleum Contract (IPC), was delayed by parliamentary amendments but is now scheduled for launch in January 2017. The State-owned National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) has already signed up an IPC with local firm, Persia Oil and Gas Development Company, which is one of eight Iranian contractors authorised to team up with international joint venture partners. Whilst Iran’s production costs may be rock bottom, foreign investment (and currently foreign exchange) is needed to deliver scale and speed of development.

NIOC (on behalf of Iran’s Ministry of Petroleum) has published its “Pre-qualification Questionnaire for Exploration and Production Oil and Gas Companies,” to be completed by 19.11.16 in order for NIOC to publish a “Long List” of qualified applicants on 7.12.16. This list is intended to be valid for two years as a pre-requisite for participating in upstream tenders. NIOC intends to then invite a short-list of qualified applicants from the long list, depending on project type (Short List).

Long List applicants will be scored according to typical technical and financial criteria but with some additional emphasis seemingly echoing NIOC’s objectives, including “scale” and “internationality”. The greatest score (25%) is allocated under the heading “Reliability” to credit ratings. Whilst it seems unusual to delegate financial capability diligence simply to reliance on a third party credit rating agencies, it does reduce the internal resources needed to sift financial data. That said, a number of those with credit ratings (and by definition, public equity or debt) may not yet have the appetite for Iranian investments, whilst those privately funded entrepreneurs and companies with strong balance sheets, may not seemingly participate, assuming that NIOC doesn’t choose to deal with non-compliant applicants.

“Scale” is assessed in terms of production rates and wells drilled over the last three years, with technical capability assessed over the same period and broken down into experience type including conventional and fractured operations, and improved and enhanced oil recovery. Choosing the last three years of oil pricing where some operations may be moth-balled etc. may be significant, but given that it is unclear as to how applicants may be assessed competitively, this is perhaps academic, provided a minimum threshold is demonstrated.

“Internationality” is judged against an “applicant’s headquarters’ business and/or registration place” which is seemingly designed to allow some flexibility to avoid being disadvantaged by a tax headquarters and otherwise to make the best of an organisation’s international operations, and possibly from more than one headquarters, if one takes a literal interpretation of the punctuation.

For the purposes of the Short List, applicants are “requested” to specify their “priorities and interested fields” and whether they wish to act as operator or non-operator. This clearly allows room for judgement versus competitors as to whether applicants would wish to share their commercial position at the outset.

It seems likely that most of the credit-rated applicants who would qualify, are already known to NIOC / have registered their interest more or less formally. The collation of extra data should enable NIOC to take into account preferences, but to grade applicants and to allocate tender opportunities in a manner perceived as transparent and which tends to avoid the dominance of any particular constituencies. Whilst the application of such process could be regarded as a short-term disincentive to some with an incumbent position, it could also be used to justify the favouring of incumbents, safe in the knowledge that the market was tested first. Otherwise, such process is likely to be regarded more generally as a welcome codification of what is expected to be a hotly-contested new market for lower cost developments.

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Iran Issues Pre-qualification for Upstream Tenders